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This dissertation investigates the individual characteristics correlated with 
auction participation decisions using data from two commercial fishing license 
buybacks.  I use the joint empirical analysis of stated and revealed preferences, with 
two major findings emerging.  First, the results of my analysis suggest that 
individuals with relatively low willingness to accept values and low engagement in 
the fishery faced problems with the participation decision which prevented them from 
tendering bids in the auction.  This has serious policy implications given that the 
efficiency of reverse auctions relies on buying goods back from individuals who 
value them the least.  The low participation rate suggests that the licenses bought 
back represent between 47 – 64 percent of the maximum achievable with the same 
funds under a first best outcome.  
Second, fishermen are frequently modeled as strict profit maximizers and 
harvest histories are often assumed to serve as a good proxy for expected future 
  
profits in many circumstances.  I find evidence against both of these assumptions.  
Indicators for bequest and enjoyment values are associated with an increased bid 
equivalent to that of a $6,500 - $20,000 increase in annual profits.  Indicators of 
bequest and enjoyment values are also significantly correlated with the decision of 
whether to tender a bid at all.  Expected future usage patterns are an important 
consideration in the participation decisions, and the expected usage can differ 
significantly from past usage patterns.  These results suggest that market experience 
plays an important role in auction participation decisions, and the problems which 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Policy Background 
 
The benefits of a reverse auction as a procurement market rely on efficient 
allocation of the good.  For a good differentiated only in price this efficiency depends 
on the buyer purchasing from those individuals with the lowest value, or willingness 
to accept (WTA), for the good.  But what happens when those individuals with the 
lowest WTA values do not participate?  Evidence suggests that just this issue 
occurred in the Maryland and Virginia’s license buybacks.  Maryland was dissatisfied 
with the low participation in their auction for licenses, rejected all bids, and offered a 
fixed price roughly equal to the 25th percentile of the bid distribution.  Ultimately 
more people accepted that fixed price offer than the total number of bidders in the 
original auction.  This result indicates that problems with the participation decision 
for the auctions kept some people who would otherwise be willing to sell their license 
from tendering bids.   
The importance of participation decisions on auction outcomes has recently 
been illustrated within the auctions literature (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003; Kjerstad 
and Vagstad, 2000; Li and Zhang, 2010).  The low participation rates in the Maryland 
and Virginia license buybacks highlight the importance of participation in terms of 
achieving management goals—in this context, the cost-effective removal of licenses 
from the fishery.   
This dissertation looks to answer three questions in order to better understand 
the license buyback participation decisions.  First, how are the Maryland and Virginia 




these results indicate about buyback design?  I link actual bids submitted by 
watermen in the above mentioned reverse auctions with hypothetical, open-ended 
WTA responses from a survey of individuals eligible for the license buybacks in 
order to generate a more complete picture of the participation decisions surrounding 
the Maryland and Virginia buybacks.  The resulting dataset is a combination of 
revealed and stated preference information that links buyback data with historical 
catch histories and stated preferences at the individual level, and provides a unique 
opportunity to investigate both the buyback participation decisions and the underlying 
value of the licenses themselves. 
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical models of optimal bidding and participation 
decisions for individuals eligible for the Maryland and Virginia license buybacks, and 
provides an empirical approach to estimating the theoretical models.  I pay special 
attention to the values that have been identified by license holders themselves in 
motivating participation decisions. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the dataset used in the empirical 
investigation.  The results of the economic analysis are presented in Chapter 4.  My 
study suggests that commercial fishermen are not strict profit maximizers.  Indicators 
for the importance of a bequest motive and the enjoyment of crabbing are 
significantly correlated with license values, with these indicator variables associated 
with an increase of between 30-40% above the baseline bid amount.  This bid 
increase is equivalent to that associated with an increase in annual profits of between 
$6,500 and $20,000, and suggests that non-pecuniary factors of utility could underlie 




past usage patterns are not necessarily good indicators of expected future profit 
streams, an important finding given that this assumption underlies most fishery 
buybacks. 
Chapter 5 presents buyback simulations based off of the WTA survey data, 
and investigates outcomes under full participation, and varying market designs.  The 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations indicate that both Maryland and Virginia fell 
far short of the number of licenses which could have been bought with the existing 
budget, primarily due to the non-participation of individuals with relatively low WTA 
values. 
Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the results and draws policy implications 
for the design of both license buybacks and other management instruments.  In 
particular, the most probable cause of the low participation rates is the increased costs 
of information gathering for inframarginal crabbers.  I explore potential steps by 
which these costs might be defrayed.         
 
1.1 The Chesapeake Bay Blue Crab Fishery 
The Blue Crab (Callinectes sapidus) fishery is the most valuable fishery in the 
Chesapeake Bay, with a dockside value of just under $109 million in 2010 (National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2010).  This is a single stock fishery 
managed in coordination by Maryland, Virginia, and the Potomac River Fisheries 
Commission.  Both Maryland and Virginia manage their crab fisheries as limited 
access, which provides transferability to the license holder, but not exclusivity to any 




crab pot licenses.  Although other blue crab licenses exist, the majority of the harvest 
in each state is landed with the use of pots, and this study focuses on policy 
instruments aimed specifically at pot licenses.  The crab population was severely 
depressed in comparison to historical numbers between the early 1990’s and 2009, 
although it has since rebounded. 
 
Table 1.1: Pot licenses in Maryland and Virginia Blue Crab fisheries 
 Maryland  Virginia 
 Recreational LCC Large Pot  Hard Peeler 
Pots Allowable 2 50 300, 600, 
900 




Trotline 1,200 ft Unlimited Unlimited  None None 
Traps & net 
rings 
30 total Unlimited Unlimited  None None 
Annual Fee ($) 5 50 150, 170, 
190 




Catch sale Prohibited Allowed Allowed  Allowed Allowed 
License sale Prohibited Allowed Allowed  Allowed Allowed 
Licenses Unknown 3,676 231, 222, 
404 




Catch Limitsa        
Hard male 1 Unlimited Unlimited  51d None 
Hard female None 2b 10, 15, 20c  51d,e None 
Peeler & soft 2 dozen Unlimited Unlimited  None 51d,e 
aBushels, unless otherwise noted
b10 bushels Sept. 1 - Nov. 10 
c6, 10, & 15 bushels June 16- Aug. 31; 25, 35, & 45 bushels Sept. 1 - Nov. 10 
dMarch 17 - May 31, 51 bushels is the combined limit for male and female crabs 
e Female harvest prohibited after November 20 
 
Thunberg (2000) defines latent effort as a continuum running from no use up 
to, but not including, full use of the allowable gear and human capital within a 




portion of capital within a fishery, and directly corresponds to overcapitalization.  
Both the Maryland and Virginia portions of the crab fishery exhibit large pools of 
latent effort, with anywhere between one third and one half of pot licenses completely 
unused in any given year.  Even so, stock assessments have indicated that the existing 
effort represented overfishing of the resource prior to 2009 (Virginia Marine 
Resources Commission, 2009). 
The large pool of latent effort induces management uncertainty, in that it is 
unclear when, or whether, effort could flow back into the fishery.  Maryland and 
Virginia share a management goal of rebuilding the crab population, for both 
conservation and economic objectives.  The economic objective is to return the crab 
populations to levels which can more effectively sustain watermen, processors, 
wholesalers, and other businesses dependent on the crab.  The major issue from the 
management perspective is whether effort is likely to re-enter the fishery as the crab 
population is successfully rebuilt.  If a large amount of latent effort re-enters, the 
fishery will act like an open access resource, with the corresponding dissipation of 
potential rents.  This influx of effort could also directly erode any conservation gains 
that would otherwise accrue to the population.  Maryland and Virginia view the 
decrease in potential effort through the direct removal of licenses as the most 
effective manner in which to achieve sustainability in the fishery.  To achieve this, the 
states implemented commercial license buybacks in 2009.  Maryland’s buyback was 
instituted in the Limited Crab Catcher (LCC) license category, while Virginia’s 




1.2 Fishery Exit Inertia and Buybacks 
1.2.1 Fishery Exit Inertia 
This dissertation provides additional insight into the issue of exit inertia.  This 
phenomenon consists of individuals continuing to fish long after a profit maximizing 
framework indicates exit from the fishery is optimal.  Exit inertia has been linked to 
numerous underlying causes over the years.    Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) 
attributed exit inertia to an issue of imperfectly malleable capital, where the salvage 
value of fishing gear is near zero despite its high acquisition costs.  Fishermen then 
become locked into a fishery as they are unable to recoup the high fixed entry costs 
upon exit.  This argument does not seem to play a role in Maryland and Virginia, 
where fixed costs represent roughly 23% of total crabbing costs (Rhodes et. al, 2001). 
Weninger and Just (1997) show how delayed exit strategies can serve as the 
dominant strategy within an individual transferrable quota (ITQ) system.  The 
Maryland and Virginia fisheries are managed as limited entry, and lack the 
exclusivity to a portion of the overall harvest which is critical in Weninger and Just’s 
argument, and thus precludes it as the explanation for the buyback results studied 
here.   
Commercial fishermen are traditionally assumed to derive all their utility from 
the profit they generate fishing.  Although other paradigms such as constrained 
revenue maximization (e.g. Kirkley & Strand, 1988) and risk aversion (e.g. Mistiaen 
& Strand, 2000; Opaluch & Bockstael, 1984) exist, commercial fishermen are often 
modeled as strict profit maximizers (e.g. Bjørndal & Conrad, 1987; Eggert & 




2011; Ward & Sutinen, 1994; Weninger & Just, 1997).  Many other values have also 
been postulated as important components of the employment decisions surrounding 
fishing (Anderson, 1980; Gatewood and McCay, 1990; Opaluch and Bockstael, 
1984).  In this paper I investigate what license holder characteristics are correlated 
with the unobservable drivers of the buyback participation decision, in order to better 
understand the economic incentives at work in these fisheries.  Use and non-use 
values are considered as potentially underlying both the value of licenses and the 
decision to participate in the buybacks.  For example, Opaluch and Bockstael (1984) 
suggest that exit from a fishery could induce “psychic costs” due to breaking with 
family tradition, and researchers have long indicated the important role family 
tradition plays in commercial fishing (e.g. Chaves et al., 2002; Horobin, 1957; Miller 
& Van Maanen, 1979).  Anderson (1980) and others (e.g. Berman, Haley, & Kim, 
1997; Pollnac & Poggie, 1988) espoused the idea of a worker satisfaction bonus, in 
which fishermen gain non-monetary benefits directly from the act of fishing.  Other 
researchers have postulated that the fisherman identity itself can generate utility (e.g. 
Davis, 2000; Gatewood & McCay, 1990; Pollnac & Poggie, 2006).  Results of a 
series of open house meetings held by Maryland prior to the buyback suggest that all 
of these are important considerations, along with bequest value and a life-cycle 
argument1, in which the expected future use differs significantly from past usage. 
 
                                                 
1 These components of license value were repeatedly mentioned by watermen in MD DNR 
open house meetings regarding LCC crabbing licenses.  Discussions with the VMRC 
revealed similar feelings expressed by crabbers in VA. For the purpose of this research the 
bequest value is theoretically modeled as paternalistic altruism (McConnell, 1997) and 
lifecycle value suggests extenuating circumstances, such as another job or young children, 




1.2.2 Commercial Fishery Buybacks 
Although their ability to produce welfare gains has been called into question 
(Clark, Munro, & Sumaila, 2007, 2005; Holland et al., 1999; Weninger & 
McConnell, 2000), buybacks are an important tool for fishery managers in dealing 
with the detrimental effects of overcapacity.  In the United States, buybacks have 
been instituted within the New England groundfish fishery (Thunberg, Kitts, & 
Walden, 2007), the Texas bay and bait shrimp fishery (Riechers, Griffin, & 
Woodward, 2007), the Washington state commercial salmon fishery (Muse, 1999), 
and the Bering Sea Pollock Buyback in Alaska (United States General Accounting 
Office, 2000).  Fishery buybacks have expended significant sums of money, with the 
Bering Sea buyback alone costing $90 million.  Buyback targets, budgets, and 
anticipated bid values in the case of auctions are often based solely as a function of 
the fishermen’s anticipated profit streams, often proxied by harvest histories.  
However, my analysis suggests that a significant portion of a license’s value can lay 
both in other determinants of utility and expected usage patterns which differ starkly 
from past harvest histories.  Further, I find evidence that marginal and inframarginal 
fishermen have problems formulating a bidding strategy.  This means the individuals 
most often targeted by buyback policies are exactly those least prepared to engage in 
the process of submitting a bid for their holdings. 
Recent economic experiments suggest that, although theoretically equivalent, 
bids within sealed bid auctions and participation in posted offer markets can differ 
significantly (Jack, 2011).  Specifically, bids tend to be significantly above an 




lower than can be theoretically justified when compared to participation decisions in 
what should be an equivalent alternative market.  One potential explanation for such 
results is value uncertainty, defined here as unfamiliarity with either the auctioned 
good or the act of explicitly developing a bid for that good.   
This uncertainty could directly interfere with formulating a bidding strategy, 
particularly with inexperienced bidders (DePiper et al., 2011).  In this paper I provide 
a more detailed investigation into what individual characteristics underlie the 
divergence in outcomes.  In particular, I find that individuals whose license value lies 
primarily in non-pecuniary factors face value uncertainty in the bid-formulation 
process.  The greatest effect of this uncertainty is observed in individuals holding 
relatively low WTA values.  Participation costs associated with either information 
gathering during the bid formulation process or the bidding itself then makes non-
participation optimal for these individuals, leading to lower participation rates than 
otherwise anticipated.   
This dissertation is not the first research to investigate buyback participation 
decisions.  Kitts et al. (2000) investigated participation in the first New England 
Groundfish fishery buyback.  This buyback was structured as a vessel buyout, and 
retired the vessel as well as all associated federal fishing permits.  Kitts et al. utilize a 
Heckman two-step analysis to investigate both the probability of bidding in the 
auction, and bid function.  Their research finds that participation was directly 
correlated with the age of the vessel and revenue dependence on the groundfish 
fishery.  However, as Kitts et al. themselves state, the research lacked demographic 




Further, Kitts et al. do not investigate the effect of a depressed participation rate on 
outcomes, in terms of increased costs of the buyback to the fishery manager. 
Avila-Forcada et al. (2012) study participation in a conservation buyout 
program aiming to protect a small porpoise, Vaquita marina (Phocoena sinus), in the 
Northern Gulf of California.  This buyout was somewhat unique as it combined a 
traditional buyout program with switch out and rent out options.  Each category was 
implemented as a posted offer buyback.  Individuals under the buyout program 
received the highest compensation, as it corresponded with a complete cessation of all 
fishing activities.  The switch out option required fishermen to switch to vaquita safe 
gear, with compensation depending on the type of gear and temporal length of the 
switch out.  The rent out option represented a suspension of fishing activities within a 
designated zone of the vaquita’s critical habitat.  A multinomial logit model was used 
to estimate an individual’s propensity to participate in each category of the buyback.  
The participation decision is modeled as a function of economic variables including 
age, education, conservation attitude, profits, alternative income sources, financial 
liabilities, and wealth for a random sample of eligible fishermen, all of which are 
significant in the participation decision to some extent.  Although the important 
variables corresponding to the participation decision are identified, these results are 
not used to investigate how the buyback outcomes compare to a first-best scenario.  
Mamula (2009) investigates participation in the Texas bay and bait shrimp 
fishery.  This buyback was structured as a dynamic sequential auction, in which 
license holders decided whether to bid or not in each year over a 13 year period.  If 




to accept or reject the sale of the license.  Mamula starts his analysis by estimating a 
Heckman two-step model of the joint decision of whether and how much to bid.  His 
analysis suggests that the probability of bidding in any round of the buyback 
correlates positively to the age of the fisherman and negatively to the length of the 
fisherman’s vessel, price of shrimp, and an indicator as to whether the fisherman has 
an offshore shrimping license in addition to the inshore license eligible for the 
buyback.  However, the final simulation of alternative buyback designs which 
Mamula undertakes does not explicitly consider the participation decision, and 
therefore a first best outcome is not compared against outcomes due to depressed 
participation rates. 
My analysis differs significantly from this previous research in that it uses 
WTA values gathered directly from fishermen to understand both the economic value 
of fishing at an individual level and the buyback participation decision.  This WTA 
data is combined with subjective beliefs on expected usage and indicators for the 
importance of both use and nonuse values, which are also missing from previous 
studies.  All of these are found to be important considerations in the participation 
decision surrounding the Maryland and Virginia buybacks.   
Conditioning the participation decision on an individual’s WTA value allows 
the identification of potential issues associated with the bidding process which might 
otherwise be transparent.  For example, the relationship between value uncertainty 
and low WTA values does not become apparent until WTA is directly controlled for.  
The low participation rates for individuals with relatively low WTA values suggests 




the first best scenario.  This disparity highlights the importance of the participation 
rate in achieving management goals. 
 
1.3 Maryland and Virginia License Buybacks 
This section provides an overview of the rules and regulations governing the 
license buybacks in Maryland and Virginia.  It also provides a summary of the results 
of each state’s buyback efforts.  The Maryland and Virginia buybacks were 
underwritten through Federal emergency disaster relief funding, which was awarded 
to the states in recognition of the dire straits faced by the blue crab fishery (Maryland 
Department of Natural Resources, 2009).   
An important note is that both Maryland and Virginia allow watermen to sell 
their commercial licenses in the open market.  A survey of classified ads indicates 
that the median asking price for a Maryland LCC license was just under $5,000 at the 
time of the buyback.  However, these asking prices are imperfect signals for a 
license’s true market value due to a thin market, unpublished clearing prices, and the 
regulatory imperative to transfer the fishing business, including gear, with the license.  
The exact gear that needs to be transferred is not defined by Maryland Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR), and thus the exact degree to which the license value is 





1.3.1 Maryland Buyback Design and Outcomes 
The Maryland LCC license buyback began as a reverse auction, with each 
license equal in terms of buyback priority.  The buyback had a total budget of $3 
million, with the only criterion for eligibility being the possession of an LCC license.  
A total of 3,676 license holders were eligible for the buyback, and each was sent a 
letter detailing the buyback rules.  The letter stated the following: 
 
1. The license holder should submit a bid for the value (s)he determines the 
license is worth. 
2. Maryland DNR will accept the lowest bids first, and continue buying 
licenses until all available funds are exhausted. 
3. The range of bids received by Maryland DNR would be used to determine 
a maximum price to be paid in the auction and any bids above this 
maximum price would be rejected.  
4. The Maryland DNR had previously conducted an independent economic 
analysis of the value of an LCC license, and any bids unrealistically high 
when compared to this value would be excluded from determining the 
maximum price to be paid for an LCC license.2 
5. The bid value should be for the license alone, and not for any associated 
assets such as boats or crabbing gear. 
                                                 
2 The economic analysis undertaken prior to the buyback was intended to highlight the 
potential drawbacks of a posted offer in comparison to an auction format specifically because 
of the lack of information regarding the license value.  This statement from the Maryland 
DNR can thus be viewed as gamesmanship aimed at incentivizing competitive bidding rather 




   
The total budget available for the buyback was not made public in the 
buyback announcement, although a target of purchasing 2,000 licenses was 
publicized by Maryland.  Individuals who held a license between April 1, 2004 and 
December 15, 2008, but recorded no crab catch during that time were advised that 
their license would be subject to new regulations for the 2010 season if their bid was 
not accepted.  These proposed regulations greatly decreased the profit generating 
capacity of the licenses, restricting both their use and transferability.  The goal of the 
proposed regulations was to induce buyback participation for those individuals not 
currently engaged in the fishery.  A total of 1,058 individuals were classified as latent 
by Maryland. 
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for the Maryland reverse auction.  All 
the Maryland statistics are broken down between active and latent classifications to 
reflect the differing profit generating capacity of these two groups, though the bids 
were not ranked by these categories in the buyback itself.  Latent license holders 
participated in greater numbers and with lower bids than those not classified as such.  
Of note is the strikingly low participation rate, given that license holders were able to 
name their own price for the license.  Even the 27% participation rate for latent 
license holders is unexpectedly low, given the serious value implications of the 






Table 1.2: Maryland LCC auction bids 
Status Obs Mean Median SD Min Max Bid 
($) ($) ($) ($) ($) (%) 
Active 210 16,749 5,000 40,077 250 300,000 8.02 
Latent  282 7,667 3,675 16,761 30 150,000 26.65 
Total  492 11,543 4,950 29,405 30 300,000 13.38 
Note: Results drop obvious protest bid of $425,000,000. 
 
At $4,950, the median bid of all bidders in the auction is very similar to 
asking prices on the open market at around the same time.  However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that these asking prices are significantly inflated above market 
clearing prices (DePiper et al., 2011), and include the transfer of business capital.  In 
a private values setting, large variations in individuals’ WTA is to be expected.  
Nonetheless, past usage patterns do not suggest that the licenses have historically 
generated a profit stream even remotely justifying the $4,950 license value.  Basic 
calculations indicate that even in years of high crab populations roughly half of all 
active license holders fail to generate positive profits (DePiper & Lipton, 2009).  
Although past usage patterns might not represent an individual’s expected future 
crabbing, the additional restrictions proposed for individuals categorized as latent 
would severely curtail their potential profit stream.  However, it is unclear how 
seriously crabbers considered the proposed regulations, given that roughly six months 
prior to the auction very similar proposals were retracted in the face of strong political 
opposition (Maryland Department of Natural Resources, 2009b). 
The participation rate was much lower and bids were much higher than 
Maryland DNR anticipated.  In light of this, Maryland rejected all bids and offered a 




presents summary statistics for take-up of the posted price offer.  The most striking 
feature of the posted offer is again the participation rate, which is much higher than 
the auction and driven primarily by the increase in participation within the latent 
license category.  Of the 285 latent crabbers who bid in the auction, 210 (~74%) 
accepted the posted price.  A total of 372 individuals accepting the posted offer 
(~54%) did not previously bid in the auction.  
 
Table 1.3: Maryland LCC posted offer buyback results 
Status Accepted Acceptance Bid Mean Bid SD Bid 
(%) (%) ($) ($)
Active 249 9.51 40.56 4,928 6,798 
Latent 434 41.02 48.39 4,602 9,100 
 
The proposed regulations for latent license holders were enacted between the 
auction and posted price offer, which confounds the direct comparison of 
participation in these two markets.  However, individuals classified as active were not 
subject to the additional restrictions, and thus their participation decisions are more 
aptly comparable.  Of particular interest is that only 41% of active individuals 
participating in the posted offer buyback had previously submitted a bid in the 
auction.  This suggests some major issues associated with the bid formulation 
process.  Eight percent of the individuals who bid in the Maryland reverse auction bid 
below the $2,260 posted offer and subsequently rejected the posted offer itself.  
Further, 27% of those active individuals who bid and ultimately accepted the $2,260 
bid at least double that amount in the auction, which is an unexpectedly high amount 




1.3.2 Virginia Buyback Design and Outcomes 
In contrast to Maryland, Virginia had a very specific formula for prioritizing 
licenses for their buyback.  Two major categories of licenses exist in Virginia, hard 
pot and peeler pot licenses.  Within these, individuals were segmented into three 
distinct groups based on their average harvest history during the 2004 – 2007 seasons: 
full time, part time, and wait list.  Full time fishermen were defined as having 
reported an average of at least 100 days of harvest in the hard shell fishery and at 
least 60 days within the peeler fishery.  Part time fishermen are defined as having 
reported less than 100 days of harvest in the hard shell fishery and less than 60 days 
of harvest in the peeler fishery.  Fishermen were placed on the wait list in either the 
peeler or hard shell fishery if they reported no harvest days for that respective fishery 
for the years between 2004 and 2007.  Waitlisted licenses are not allowed to be 
transferred, sold, or used for crabbing until the population of crabs older than one 
year is estimated to be above 200 million for three consecutive years.  At the time of 
the buyback, the crab population had not surpassed the 200 million threshold since 
the early 1990’s, although it has been surpassed in all three years since 2009.  The 
rules of the Virginia buyback were as follows:  
 
1. The Virginia Marine Resource Commission (VMRC) had a budget of 
$6,724,470 for the buyback program.   
2. Funds were dedicated to full-time, part-time, and waiting listed fishermen 
for the buyback such that 50 percent, 30 percent, and 20 percent of the 




3. Each bid would be divided by the maximum number of pots allowed by 
the specific license and the average number of reported days of harvest 
between 2004 and 2007 in order to calculate a bid per pot day. 3  For 
individuals who received the license for the first time in 2008 or 2009, that 
year’s crabbing effort would serve to calculate the bid per pot day value. 
4. Bid per pot day would be ranked in ascending order within each category 
(full time vs. part time vs. wait list), and purchased from lowest to highest 
until all funds allocated to that category were exhausted.  
5. The VMRC reserves the right to reject any excessive bids, with an 
excessive bid being defined after all bids have been submitted. 
6. Individuals selling their license through the buyback are eligible to re-
enter the fishery by purchasing a license from another fisherman. 
 
The results of the Virginia license buyback are summarized in Table 1.4.  
Participation rates are quite a bit higher than those in the Maryland auction across all 
license categories.  Bids are also much higher in Virginia, a function of the larger 
number of pots which the Virginia licenses allow in comparison to Maryland, directly 
corresponding to larger profit earning potential, coupled with a much smaller total 
supply of licenses in Virginia.  Also in contrast to Maryland, licenses categorized as 
wait listed in Virginia were already frozen at the time of the auction.  Ultimately the 
VMRC spent a total of $6,725,161 buying 359 licenses back, and expended their 
budget completely. 
                                                 
3 Although not explicitly indicated in the auction instructions, the bids of individuals on the 
waitlist, who have no harvest history between 2004 and 2007, were ranked in ascending order 




Table 1.4: Virginia commercial pot license auction bids ($ thousands) 
Status Obs Mean Med SD Min Max Bid 
Hard Pot  ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) (%) 
Full time 49 114.41 98.00 116.83 6.00 600.00 25.26 
Part time 232 59.10 30.00 73.30 0.50 634.00 24.29 
Waitlist 141 20.33 10.00 29.44 1.00 220.00 43.65 
Peeler Pot   
Full time 27 40.36 20.00 58.53 2.00 200.00 24.11 
Part time 126 38.48 15.25 50.99 0.50 300.00 29.44 
Waitlist 89 19.01 8.00 23.20 1.00 125.00 59.73 
 
The buyback summary statistics indicate some intriguing participation 
patterns.  In particular, the apparent preference reversals between Maryland’s reverse 
auction and fixed price offer suggest that value uncertainty could be playing a role in 
individual’s participation decisions.  The next section lays out the process by which 
this information will be utilized in order to better understand participation decisions, 




Chapter 2: A Model of Bidding 
 
In this section I develop models of the bid function and the participation 
decision surrounding Maryland and Virginia’s license buybacks.  Two key 
differences exist between my model and much of the existing literature on auctions.  
The first is my specific interest in what individual characteristics are correlated with 
the decision to bid or not, and its implications for the realization of management 
objectives.  Maryland’s buyback indicates that a large number of individuals with 
relatively low WTA values did not bid in the auction.  Understanding who bid is the 
first step in understanding why the divergence in participation rates between the 
posted price and auction markets occurred.  The second difference that sets my model 
apart is my interest in the non-monetary motives for both whether and what to bid.  I 
have already provided casual evidence that profits do not explain the variation in bids.  
In order to provide empirical evidence I begin my discussion of this section with a 
simple model of bidding. 
 
2.1 Theory of Bidding and the Participation Decision 
2.1.1 A Simple Model of Bidding 
In the neoclassical framework, commercial fishermen are traditionally 
assumed to derive all their utility from the profit they generate fishing, and are very 




the net present value of expected future profit streams.  Assuming risk neutrality this 
can formally be represented in discrete time as: 
 
(2.1)   ∑ ,  . 
 
In this formulation ,  represents individual ’s profits in time  and  is the 
discount factor.  The value of the license, and thus an individual’s bid in the license 
buybacks, is then simply the expected discounted flow of profits that can be generated 
from crabbing (plus a non-negative amount of bid shading due to the pay-as-bid 
structure of the auction).   
A regression of an individual’s bid amount on the flow of expected future 
profits should then explain most of the bid variation within the Maryland and Virginia 
license buybacks.  Table 2.1 presents simple regressions of the natural log of an 
individual’s bid amount on their average historical annual profits in order to 
investigate whether profits alone can explain bidding patterns.  This is a functional 
representation of equation 2.1 and assumes that historical profits provide a good 
proxy for expected future earnings, a common assumption in the literature.  The 
results indicate that, although highly significant with a p-value of 0.000 in both states, 
profits alone fail to explain a great deal of the variance in individual bids within 
Maryland and Virginia’s auctions.  This in turn suggests that a more complex model 
of behavior is necessary in order to better explain the decisions surrounding the 





Table 2.1: Regression of bid amount on profits 
(standard error) 
 Maryland Virginia 
Constant -3.1784* -1.7179* 
(0.0572) (0.0505) 
Profits 0.5542* 0.7195* 
(0.1231) (0.0734) 
R-squared 0.0397 0.1267 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 492 664 
*Significant < 10% level 
 
2.1.2 A More Complex Model of Bidding 
Given that fishermen derive non-pecuniary utility from fishing, an individual 
fisherman is assumed to have a utility function of the following form: 
 
(2.2)  , .          
 
Here  defines fisherman ’s profits from crabbing. Vector  is composed of 
indicators for the previously mentioned non-pecuniary factors of utility, as well as 
demographic variables. 
 Individuals bid in an auction only if they expect to gain from doing so. Given 
the utility function in equation 2.2, the choice of whether to participate in the auction 
depends on whether the utility from participation is greater than the utility from not 





(2.3)  	 , , ,  
  1 	 	 , , , , , . 
	
Here  represents probability,  is individual ’s bid value, 	  is the 
state’s exogenous cutoff price in the auction,  represents the cost of participating in 
the auction,4 and all other terms are defined as before.  The cutoff price is the largest 
bid accepted within the auction.  The probability 	  represents 
individual ’s subjective probability of winning the auction.  Thus the individual 
participates in the auction if the expected payoff from participation (left hand side of 
equation 2.3 is greater than the reservation value of the license (right hand side of 
equation 2.3). 
After rearranging equation 2.3, an individual participates if: 
 
(2.4)  	 	 , , , , , ,  
  , , , , , 0.  
     
The first and second terms in equation 2.4 represent the expected utility and disutility 
from participating in the auction, respectively.    
Individual ’s subjective probability of winning the auction is a function of 
their beliefs over the cutoff price such that: 
 
                                                 
4 This cost can be thought of as either monetary or psychological cost of participation.  
Psychological costs could stem from a distrust of any interactions with the state, a lack of 
understanding as to the exact rules of the auction, or any other issue which makes 





(2.5)  	 	 1 .  
 
In this framework ∙  and ∙  are respectively the cumulative distribution 
and probability density functions of the subjective belief over the cutoff price.  The 
probability of winning the auction thus depends on a fisherman’s expectations over 
the distribution of the cutoff price.  In what follows, it is assumed that fishermen face 
an exogenous cutoff price within the auction.  I use an exogenous cutoff for two 
reasons.  First, the instructions for the Maryland buyback expressly state that an 
independent economic evaluation of a license value had been undertaken, and any 
bids substantially greater than this value would be summarily rejected.  Similarly, the 
instructions in Virginia state that VMRC reserves the right to reject any bid that it 
determines to be excessive.  Both states also indicated that the exact cutoff price 
would be calculated from the distribution of bids received in the auction itself.  Thus, 
although the exact cutoff price is endogenous, there is an exogenous upper bound on 
that cutoff price.  Second, in both the MD and VA license buybacks there were a 
large number of potential participants (3,676 in MD and 1,835 in VA).  It is likely 
that, with such a large group of potential bidders, individuals will take the value 
below which bids will be accepted as exogenous, suggesting a decision-theoretic 
rather than a game-theoretic framework is appropriate.  Thus, although the cutoff 
price is endogenous to the system, any given individual will treat the cutoff price as 
exogenous. 
  The auction environment can be characterized as a multi-unit, sealed, pay-as-




Structural models of similar auctions have recently been developed (T. Li, 2005; 
Menezes & Monteiro, 2000).  However, the license buybacks in Maryland and 
Virginia differ significantly from these frameworks in important ways.  First, the 
license buybacks are reverse auctions, such that bidders were sellers and not buyers 
within the auction.  This suggests that license holders should already have some sense 
as to the value of the license prior to the auction, and thus make the participation 
decision with a sense of what their WTA is.  This is in contrast to many structural 
auction models, in which the participation decision is made prior to an individual’s 
draw from the value distribution.  Second, as previously mentioned the size of the 
pool of participants is large enough that a decision theoretic framework is 
appropriate.   
To proceed, functional forms for equation 2.4 must be specified.  Ultimately, a 
license provides an expected flow of services throughout the lifetime of individual .  
Formulated over discrete time, the expected utility of this service flow can be 
represented as: 
 
(2.6)  , , ∑ , , , , ,  
 ∑ , .  
 
Both profit and license use is assumed to be random, and expectations are 
made over these components of utility.  Utility is assumed to be increasing in all 
arguments, with decreasing marginal returns.  The flow of utility in equation 2.6 is 
broken into two distinct time periods.  The first summation encapsulates the utility 




which individual  personally uses the license.  Here 	∙  represents utility over 
income, ,  is annual fishing profit, , ,  is a function defining non-pecuniary 
use value derived from crabbing, , ,  is a function which represents non-
use values associated with the ownership of a license, and  is the discount factor.   
 The second summation in equation 2.6 represents the bequest value of the 
license, , ,  accrued from the time the license is passed on to the beneficiary 
until the end of the benefactor’s lifetime.  If bequest value is in the form of paternal 
altruism (McConnell, 1997), then this utility is generated from the expected flow of 
services provided to the license beneficiary.  This service flow will be a function of 
expected revenue that a beneficiary will earn, , , a random variable.  If a 
beneficiary does not exist, the second term in equation 2.5 is replaced with the 
discounted salvage value, or market price, of the license at time period 1.   
An individual deciding whether to participate in the auction forecasts the 
expected future flow of utility encapsulated in equation 2.6.  This expected flow then 
feeds into equation 2.4, which captures the participation decision itself.  Assuming 
risk neutrality, 5 an individual is interested solely in the expected value of future 
profits.  Further, given the use of indicator variables to capture the importance of non-
pecuniary factors of utility in the bidding decision, these also enter the model linearly.  
With these assumptions, a functional representation of equation 2.6 is:     
  
(2.7)  , , ,       
                                                 
5 I estimated an alternative linear mean-standard deviation specification for the functional 
form of utility over profits, which indicated no significant sensitivity of the bidding decision 




with both  and  as parameters to be estimated, ,  representing mean future 
profits, and  is a vector of variables capturing non-monetary arguments of utility.  
Substituting equations 2.5 and 2.7 into 2.4, and assuming that the cost of 
participation, , enters the utility function linearly, individuals will bid in the auction 
if: 
 
(2.8)   1 α , 0.    
 
The fact that we only observe the decision to participate in the auction as an 
indicator of the underlying difference in expected utility suggests a latent variable 
construct.  The latent variable ∗ is the change in utility that an individual fisherman 
expects from bidding in the auction.  Formally: 
 
(2.9)  ∗ 	 1 α , , , .   
 
In this representation, ,  and ,  are factors governing utility which are known to 
the individual but not to the researcher.  Instead of ∗, the researcher only observes a 
binary outcome , which maps to the latent variable as follows: 
 
(2.10)   1 if ∗ 0, otherwise 0.   
 
The indicator 1 denotes that individual  participated in the auction.  
As previously noted, the subjective probability of winning the auction is 




exogenous cutoff prices.  A negative exponential function is used to model this 
expectation. 6  From equation 2.5 we then have: 
 
(2.11)  	 1  
 
Here  is a vector of the variables governing an individual’s expectations of the 
state’s cutoff price.  These variables look to capture the familiarity an individual has 
with the distribution of license values.  The parameter vector  is to be estimated.  
The subscript on the cumulative distribution function indicates that this distribution is 
an individual’s subjective believe, and varies from person to person. 
Substituting 2.11 into 2.9 results in the following empirical specification: 
 
(2.12)  ∗ α , . 
 
The constant  captures the costs of participation, among other factors driving the 
baseline participation rate.   is a vector of demographic characteristics which 
influence participation in the auction, and  is a parameter vector to be estimated.  
All other variables and parameters are as previously defined.  The  term is equal to 
, , .  Assuming that  is distributed 0,1 , we have from equation 2.12 that 
the probability of bidding is equal to the probability that ∗ 0, which can be 
estimated within a probit framework.  More formally the log-likelihood function is: 
                                                 
6 The negative exponential is a Weibull distribution with the shape parameter restricted to 1.  
A Weibull distribution with no restriction on the shape parameter was also estimated, but 
likelihood ratio tests indicated that it provided no gains in model fit as compared to the 





(2.13)  ∑ y lnΦ α ,  
∑ 1 y ln	 1 Φ α , . 
 
Φ ∙  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and  equaling the 
number of individuals eligible for the buyback. 
 
2.2 Empirical Strategy 
A complication with equation 2.13 is that the bid is only observed for 
individuals who actually submitted a bid in the auction.  Additionally, equation 2.13 
does not specify the determinants of individuals’ bids themselves.  For this reason, I 
need to develop predicted bids for everyone eligible for the buyback.  I estimate a 
Heckman two-step model, which allows me to recover the parameters of subjective 
probability that can be coupled with the WTA data from the survey in order to predict 
an individual’s bid, regardless of whether they participated in the auction or not.  I 
then use these predicted bids in order to estimate the likelihood in equation 2.13.  The 
Heckman also allows an investigation into the bid function, and whether incidental 
truncation might bias OLS estimates.  The estimation proceeds as follows. 
 
Stage 1 – Estimate a Heckman two-step model for two primary reasons.  First, 
I recover the parameters of subjective probability that are used in stage 2 in 
order to predict an individual’s bid.  Second, the Heckman allows me to 




estimation of the bid function, and what individual characteristics explain bid 
variation. 
 
Stage 2 – Use the parameters of subjective probability of winning the auction 
and an individual’s WTA value from the survey in order to predict optimal 
bids for individuals, regardless as to whether or not they actually bid in the 
auction. 
 
Stage 3 – The predicted bids are then incorporated into the full model in order 
to understand what individual characteristics are correlated with the decision 
of whether to bid or not.  I am particularly interested in what variables of the 
utility function are correlated with the participation decision.  I use an E-M 
algorithm to iterate between estimating equation 2.13 and generating predicted 
bids based off of an individual’s WTA in stage 2, until convergence. 
 
 
2.2.1 Stage 1: Heckman Selection Correction for the Bidding Model 
If risk neutral, individual ’s optimal bid is the solution to the following 
maximization problem: 
 
(2.14)  1 . 
 
Here  is individual ’s WTA value for the license.  The FOC of equation 2.14 





(2.15)   ∗
∗
∗ 0.  
 
Given the pay-as-bid market design of the auctions, the individual’s optimal bid is 
thus their WTA plus an additional shading term specifically composed of the Mill’s 
ratio 
∗
∗ .  Using the exponential distribution for the Mill’s ratio, equation 2.15 is 
then: 
 
(2.16)  ∗ 0 . 
 
Following Greene (2003, p. 782-785) and making changes in the notation for 
consistency with my previous specifications, the equation of interest in the Heckman 
model is the bid function: 
 
(2.17)  ln ∗ 	 , , 
 
which is observed only if individuals bid in the auction.  The truncation of the 
distribution of bids affects the expectation of equation 2.17, and must be controlled 
for.  To do this, a selection model is first estimated.  This selection model is an 
alternative specification of the latent variable model in equation 2.12, given the 





(2.18)  ∗ , . 
 
The  term is the conditional mean of the subjective probability of winning the 
auction, ∗ takes the value of one if an individual bid in the auction and zero 
otherwise,  is an error term, and all other arguments are as previously specified.  
The mean of the subjective probability of winning the auction is used to gain a more 
accurate starting estimate for the parameters of the negative exponential function.  
Assuming  and  follow a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and 
correlation coefficient , equation 2.18 can be estimated within a probit framework, 
maximizing the log-likelihood function ∑ y lnΦ ,
∑ 1 y ln 1 Φ , .  
Once this selection model is estimated, its parameters are used to correct equation 
2.17 by inserting 
∗
∗  as a regressor, with ∙  and Φ ∙  representing the 
standard normal probability density and cumulative distribution functions, 
respectively, and ∗ representing predictions generated from the estimates of equation 
2.18.  The specification of the bid function equation now becomes: 
 
(2.19)  ln	 ∗ 	 ,
∗ , 
   
with  as a parameter to be estimated, and this specification now the 
conditional expectation of an incidentally truncated bivariate normal distribution, 




the parameters of the subjective probability of winning the auction  are 
necessary.   
 
2.2.2 Stage 2: Generating Predicted Bids 
 
The identity in equation 2.16 defines an individual’s optimal bid, and 
calculating this bid is straightforward once the parameters of the subjective 
probability of winning the auction are combined with an individual’s WTA value.  
This process generates predicted bids for all individuals, regardless as to whether they 
bid in the auction, and serves as the starting point of the E-M algorithm in Stage 3. 
 
2.2.3 Stage 3: E-M Algorithm 
 
The predicted bids in Stage 2 are then substituted into equation 2.13 and the 
log-likelihood is maximized with respect to the observed data.  This maximization 
provides new estimates for the parameters in the subjective probability of winning the 
auction, which serves as the maximization step in the E-M algorithm.  These 
parameter estimates can then be substituted into equation 2.16, in order to provide a 
new predicted bid.  The estimation and maximization steps are then iterated, until 
convergence.  I define convergence as predicted bids differing by no more than 1∙e-14 




The importance of Stage 3 is as follows.  WTA is defined as the smallest 
amount of money an individual would willingly accept as compensation for the loss 
of their commercial fishing license.  Through equation 2.16 the bid amount is this 
WTA plus a non-negative amount of money, which depends on how likely an 
individual feels it is that they will win the auction.  The non-negative amount of 
money above an individual’s WTA value is termed bid shading.  The more likely an 
individual feels it is they will win the auction, the larger the shading of their bid 
amount above their WTA.  Thus the entire value of the license should be captured 
within the bid value, and the only parameter of significance in the utility function 
should be that associated with the bid amount itself.  The significance of parameters 
associated with indicators of non-pecuniary factors of utility in the bidding decision, 
despite conditioning on the bid amount, then provides evidence consistent with value 
uncertainty with respect to these non-monetary factors.  The next chapter provides a 





Chapter 3 : Data 
 
The primary equation of interest is the latent variable model of equation 2.12: 
 
∗ α , .  
 
Vector  contains variables capturing individual license holder demographic 
characteristics.  The  vector consists of variables identifying characteristics which 
govern an individual’s subjective probability of winning the auction.  Vector  
contains variables serving as indicators of use and non-use values.  The ,  variable 
is expected future profits, in this analysis represented by an individual’s mean annual 
historical profits.  The  is an individual’s bid amount, which is predicted through 
the three step process previously outlined using a individual’s self reported WTA 
values.  The  is a constant term and ,	α , ,  are either parameters or vectors of 
parameters, all of which are to be estimated.  Table 3.1 identifies the exact variables 
used in the analysis, and the source of the data.  The core variables originate from a 
survey I designed and implemented specifically to support this research.  An 
important exception is the mean historical profits, which links individual catch 
histories7 to crab price data, both of which are gathered by the states of Maryland and 
Virginia, and crabbing cost data from an independent survey of Chesapeake Bay 
crabbers (Rhodes et al., 2001). 
                                                 
7 In calculating mean annual profits I use ten years of harvest histories (1999 – 2008) for 
Virginia and thirteen years of harvest histories (1996 – 2008) in Maryland.  I calculate profits 
for all individuals eligible for the buybacks based on their activity in the fishery, with 




 Table 3.1: Variables for empirical specification 




 Age  MD  Date of birth, provided by 
MD DNR. 







 Indicator variable self-
identification as a 
recreational or commercial 
crabber.  Survey data. 




 Indicates multiple license 
holders share the same 
mailing address. 
  Probably Crab  MD, 
VA 
 Indicates individual felt it 
very likely they would crab in 
2010, the year after the 
buyback.  Survey data. 
  Distance  MD,  
VA 
 Straight line mileage from 
Maryland DNR and VMRC 
offices. 
  Within 35 miles  VA  Indicates if individual's 
mailing address is within 35 
miles of the VMRC offices. 
  Large pot 
licenses 
 VA  Indicates whether individual 
holds a large (  255) hard 
pot license.  Provided by 
VMRC. 
  Non-crabbing 
license 
 VA  Indicates whether individual 
holds non-crabbing fishing 
licenses.  Provided by 
VMRC. 
  Full time, Part 
time, Wait List 
 VA  Indicates how individual was 
categorized by state.  
Provided by VMRC. 
  Latent  MD  Indicates if individual was 
classified as latent.  Provided 
by MD DNR. 
  Stopped 
crabbing 
 MD  Indicates whether individual 
stopped crabbing in four 
years prior to buyback, but 
was not classified as Latent.  





Table 3.1 (continued): Variables for empirical specification 




 Late reporting  MD  Indicates whether individual 
filed fewer late reports in 
2009 than 2008 (months prior 
to buyback).  Provided by 
MD DNR. 
  High Education  MD  Indicates whether individual 
completed at least some 
college coursework.  Survey 
data. 
  Heard  VA  Indicates whether individual 
heard of other crabbing 
licenses being sold.  Survey 
data. 
  Two pot licenses  VA  Indicates whether individual 
owns both a hard and peeler 
pot license.  Provided by 
VMRC. 
μi – monetary 
utility 
 Average annual 
profits 
 MD,  
VA 
 Represents expected profits.  
Generated from individual 
catch history and price data 
gathered by the MD DNR 
and VMRC, and joined to 
cost data gathered by a 1999 
cost survey of Chesapeake 
Bay crabbers (Rhodes et al., 
2001). 
  Mean earnings  MD  Mean earnings for an 
individual’s zip code, from 
the 2000 U.S. Census. 
Zi –  
Non-monitary 
utility 
 Identity, Family 
History 
 MD,  
VA 
 Self-reported indicator for 
which contributes the most to 
the value of an individual's 
license.  Survey data. 




 Indicates if a bequest value or 
the enjoyment of crabbing 
was considered in the 
participation decision.  
Survey data. 
 
It is these profits used in the regression of Table 2.1.  Figure 3.1 and Figure 




graphs, most crabbers are barely covering the costs of crabbing.  Additionally, when 
compared to the distribution of actual bids in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4, the bid 
distributions exhibit a much thicker tail than the distribution of profits. 
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Figure 3.2: Kernel density of Virginia license holder average annual crabbing profits 
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Figure 3.4: Histogram of actual bid values for Virginia licenses < $600,000 
 
The majority of the remaining data were gathered from a survey mailed in 
April 2010, shortly after the auctions closed, to nearly all individuals eligible for the 
buyback.  The exception is a small number of individuals in each state that acquired 
licenses after the beginning of the buyback.  Because these individuals could have 
acquired licenses for the specific purpose of bidding in the auction, and thus could bid 
in patterns significantly different than the general population of license holders, they 
were excluded from the survey.  In Maryland this restriction excluded 85 individuals, 
or 2.3 percent, and in Virginia I excluded 64 individuals, or 3.5 percent of all license 
holders eligible for the buyback. 
The survey garnered response rates of roughly 33% in Maryland and 25% in 
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3.5 and Figure 3.6 provide histograms of the WTA values submitted as part of this 
survey.  A comparison of the WTA histograms with those of the actual bids indicates 
that the tail of the WTA distribution is thicker, which is to be expected given that 
people with high WTA values are less likely to win the auction, and thus less likely to 
participate.  I excluded WTA values greater than $1 million from the analysis, as a 
cutoff for what would be deemed a protest bid.  This cutoff excluded six individuals 
from Maryland, or 0.5 percent of survey responders, and 14 individuals from 
Virginia, or 3.2 percent of responders. 
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Figure 3.6: Histogram of WTA values < $600,000 for Virginia crabbing licenses 
 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 respectively provide summary statistics for the 
indicator and continuous variables used in my analysis.  These statistics represent the 
sample of individuals used within the analysis of Sections 4.1 through 4.4, with 1,035 
observations in Maryland, and 463 observations in Virginia.  The exception to this is 
the WTA variables, which suffered from a roughly 30% item nonresponse rate.  In 
Maryland and Virginia there are respectively 743 and 390 WTA observations.  I 
investigate the deviation of these statistics from the universe of license holders due to 
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 Table 3.2: Summary statistics for indicator variables 
 Maryland  Virginia 
Variables Mean SD  Mean SD 
Stopped Crabbing 0.15 0.36    
Latent 0.23 0.42    
Late Reporting 0.74 0.44    
High Education 0.43 0.50    
Bequest 0.57 0.50  0.24 0.43 
Family History 0.32 0.47  0.37 0.48 
Identity 0.47 0.50  0.52 0.50 
Enjoy Crabbing 0.61 0.49  0.47 0.50 
Commercial 0.27 0.44  0.76 0.43 
Both rec. and comm. 0.48 0.50  0.18 0.38 
Probably Crab 0.84 0.37  0.74 0.44 
Mult holders at address 0.03 0.17  0.11 0.31 
Peeler Pot License    0.32 0.47 
Within 35 mi    0.38 0.49 
Two Pot licenses    0.51 0.50 
Heard    0.72 0.45 
Non-crabbing licenses    0.65 0.48 
Large pot license    0.39 0.49 
Full Time    0.12 0.33 
Wait List    0.16 0.37 
 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics for continuous variables 
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max 
Maryland      
Age (years) 58 14 59 18 89 
Profits ($1,000) 1.97 54.87 0.22 -10.36 59.66 
WTA ($1,000) 36.50 137.08 5.00 0.20 1,000 
Mean Earnings 59.94 13.92 59.81 23.96 111.82 
Total Distance 36.00 20.16 34.72 0.52 221.21 
Virginia      
WTA ($1,000) 100.29 169.08 50.00 0.50 1,000 
Profits ($1,000) 3.97 9.61 0.00 -10.40 59.48 
Total Distance 50.42 29.86 50.27 2.84 149.12 
 
 
In what follows the effect of variables on the probability of bidding is 




latent variable in equation 2.12.  All else equal, the larger the value of the license, the 
less probable that the latent variable is greater than zero, and thus less likely an 
individual is to bid in the auction.  This is because a larger value is less likely to be 
accepted by either the Maryland DNR or VMRC, and thus the expected payoff from 
participation is low.  The discussion also presents expected effects without controlling 
directly for the WTA in the models, as the WTA should capture the full value of a 
license by its definition. 
I begin a discussion of the expected effect of variables on both the value of the 
license and probability of bidding with the indicator variables of Table 3.2.  The 
Stopped Crabbing, Latent, and Wait List indicators control for recent inactivity in the 
fishery and should be inversely correlated to the value of a license, and positively 
correlated with the bidding decision.  Intuitively this is a result of the value of the 
license lying in something other than current profits or usage.  Any use values will 
thus be based off of expected future usage patterns, which are discounted.  
Conversely, the Probably Crab variable corresponds to expected crabbing in the near 
future.  This represents an increase in value, and decreased probability of 
participation when compared to the baseline in which individuals felt it was less 
likely they would crab.  The increased value associated with the expected crabbing in 
the near future is a result of either a continuation of historical usage patterns for those 
individuals who have been crabbing, or a re-entry into the fishery for those 
individuals who have not recently been crabbing.  Similarly the Full time designation 
corresponds to increased recent use intensity in Virginia, and should provide for 




effect this designation should have on participation.  The raw participation rates 
between the Full time and Part time auctions, presented in Table 1.4, do not seem to 
indicate a large difference.  Given that the higher valued licenses in the Full time 
classification were only ranked against similarly high valued licenses, there is no 
theoretical reason to believe that this classification should induce a significant effect 
on participation.   
Given the baseline recreational designation, the Commercial and Both rec. and 
comm. indicators should correspond to higher license values, and lower participation 
in the buybacks.  For individuals currently crabbing, the significance of these 
designations is questionable given that profits and usage patterns are already 
controlled for.  However, for individuals not currently engaged in the fishery, these 
variables are likely directly correlated with the expected usage intensity, and thus 
could be important control variables. 
As compared to the baseline profit importance, the additional use and non-use 
motives indicated by the Bequest, Family History, Identity, and Enjoy Crabbing 
variables should correspond to an increased value of licenses.  This is because these 
are values in addition to profits, which are already controlled for in the models.  The 
increased value should thus correspond to a decreased probability of bidding in the 
auction.  The Large pot and Peeler Pot license indicators should also correspond to an 
increased value of licenses.  This is due to the increased potential profits represented 
by these license types when compared to smaller hard crab licenses.  The effect of 




The variables of the subjective probability of winning the auction have 
unclear effects on the value of the license and the probability of bidding.  
Theoretically these variables govern the expectation over the exogenous cutoff price 
for the auctions.  The Late Reporting, Two Pot licenses, and Heard variables look to 
capture engagement in the fishery, and thus familiarity with either the distribution of 
values within the population of license holders or the market price of these licenses.  
The High Education indicator looks to capture familiarity with concepts of 
probability, as well as the opportunity costs of crabbing.  The effect on the bid 
amount is always non-negative, as these variables act through the bid shading term.  
However, the relative magnitude of these effects will depend on the relationship of 
the conditional expectation of the cutoff price with an individual’s value.  The 
variables of the subjective probability should facilitate the decision by providing 
more accurate expectations over the cutoff price.  The relative effect on the 
participation will again depend on the expectation in conjunction with an individual’s 
license value. 
The relationship between the Mult holders at address variable and both the 
value of the license and the probability of crabbing is also ambiguous.  More than one 
license holder at a single address could capture economies of scale that increase the 
profitability of the licenses, and thus an increase in the comparative value of the 
license.  Conversely, the multiple licenses could signal excess capacity, which would 
then decrease the value of any single license in the household.  The Non-crabbing 
license variable also represents an ambiguous impact on both the value of a license 




complementarities across fisheries are likely.  An individual holding other 
commercial licenses could then be expected to increase the value of the crab license.  
Conversely, the additional licenses might represent increased opportunity costs of 
crabbing and a corresponding decrease in the value of the crabbing license.  Given 
that the blue crab fishery is the most valuable in the bay the latter interpretation is 
unlikely, but cannot be ruled out. 
The most likely channel by which the Age variable of Table 3.3 affects the 
value of the license is through the time horizons governing the flow of values derived 
from an individual’s license.  Given that this variable captures an individual’s date of 
birth, the effect should be positive as an increase in the variable suggests longer use 
horizons.  However, the Age variable could also represent an increased opportunity 
cost, in that younger fishermen could have more occupational flexibility 
corresponding to a decreased economic value of the license (Gimeno et al., 1997). 
Increased profits from crabbing should correspond to an increase in the value 
of the license, given that these licenses are, at their core, profit generating assets.  
This suggests an inverse relationship between profits and participation rates.   
The Mean Earnings variable looks to control for non-fishing household 
income.  In general this variable can be thought to represent the opportunity cost 
associated with holding the license, and should be negatively correlated with the 
license value.  This suggests a positive correlation with the probability of bidding in 
the auction. 
An exclusion restriction is necessary for identification purposes within the 




selection model that does not, and theoretically should not, appear within the second 
step bid function model.  I thus need a variable which affects the decision of whether 
or not to bid in the auction, but not the amount bid.  I use the distance of each 
individual’s postal address from the MD DNR and VMRC offices as instruments for 
the Maryland and Virginia specifications.  Specifically, the straight line distance from 
the postal address to the state offices is included in the selection model, along with a 
dummy variable indicating whether the mailing address is within 35 miles of VMRC 
office for Virginia’s specification, but excluded from the bid function.  The distance 
from the state office should not realistically affect the value bid for a license, but 
there are valid reasons to believe that they could affect the participation decision. 8  
Specifically, the further the distance from the state offices, the longer mail delivery is 
likely to take.  In Maryland the bid submission window was less than a month from 
the mail date of the announcement, and thus delayed delivery could greatly affect the 
participation decision of eligible individuals.  This reasoning would suggest that 
distance is negatively correlated with participation in the auction. 
  
                                                 
8 An exception to this argument would be if the distance from the office were correlated with 
travel costs to the fishery.  However, this does not seem to be the case, given that out-of-state 
residence, which should be correlated with the highest travel costs, was not a significant 
factor in the amount bid in the auction.  Additionally, the geography of the area provides for 
shoreline at a significant distance away from the state offices of both Maryland and Virginia 
in numerous directions, and the mailing addresses of license holders are by and large 




Chapter 4 : Estimation Results 
Maryland’s auction failed to induce participation for a large number of 
individuals who ultimately sold their license through the posted price offer.  The bids 
in the auction are also much higher than many individuals ultimately accepted in the 
posted price offer.  In the results I focus on the most important individual 
characteristics explaining the Maryland and Virginia participation decisions, with a 
particular interest in non-monetary motives.  My analysis looks to understand the 
differences in participation rates between the two Maryland buyback designs, and 
whether similar participation patterns presented themselves in Virginia. 
 
4.1 Heckman Model 
 
The first step of my analysis is the Heckman model, detailed in Table 4.1.  
Model results including insignificant parameter estimates can be found in Table 
A.A.1 of Appendix A.  Significant parameter signs are generally consistent with 
theory, when an unambiguous relationship exists.  In both states past and expected 
future usage patterns are significantly correlated with the decision of whether or not 
to bid, as can be noted from the parameters estimates on the Stopped Crabbing and 
Latent variables in Maryland and the Probably Crab variable in both states.  The 
Stopped Crabbing and Latent variables are associated with an increased probability of 
participating in the auction, while the Probably Crab variable is associated with a 
decreased probability of bidding.  In each state the parameters associated with the 




Table 4.1: Heckman selection models estimating auction participation and 
bid function (standard error) 
 Selection model Bid function 
 Maryland Virginia Maryland Virginia 
Constant -2.3231* -0.1159 -4.4105* -2.2562* 
 (0.4009) (0.4005) (0.3826) (0.3668) 
Demographics    
Age -0.1489  0.6993* 
 (0.1144)  (0.1742) 
Stopped Crabbing 0.5537*   
 (0.1618)   
Latent 0.7988*   
 (0.1364)   
Probably Crab -0.4868* -0.5845* 0.5723* 0.6737* 
 (0.1334) (0.1931) (0.1762) (0.2699) 
Commercial -0.3049* 0.2305 0.9949* 0.7381* 
 (0.1643) (0.1837) (0.2505) (0.2156) 
Both Rec. and Comm. -0.4087*  0.6932* 
 (0.1313)  (0.1944) 
Mult holders at address 0.6514* -0.0235  -0.6132* 
 (0.3057) (0.2335)  (0.2884) 
Wait List -0.2441  -0.2639 
 (0.2232)  (0.2618) 
Full Time 0.0977  0.5972* 
 (0.2540)  (0.2886) 
Large pot license 0.1938  0.7808* 
 (0.1506)  (0.1736) 
Non-crabbing licenses -0.2596  0.4820* 
 (0.1653)  (0.2218) 
Utility indicators   
Profits -0.0069 -0.2456* 0.3783* 0.1910 
 (0.1237) (0.0981) (0.2161) (0.1474) 
Mean Earnings 0.0252  1.2202* 
 (0.4290)  (0.5745) 
Family History -0.2704*   
 (0.1298)   
Bequest -0.3961*  0.3344* 
 (0.1137)  (0.1761) 
Identity  -0.2645*   
  (0.1454)   
Enjoy crabbing -0.4271*  0.4560* 
 (0.1455)  (0.2035) 
Subjective Probability    
Late Reporting -0.3145*  





Table 4.1 (continued): Heckman selection models estimating auction 
participation and bid function (standard error) 
 Selection model Bid function 
 Maryland Virginia Maryland Virginia 
High Education -0.2389*  
 (0.0729)  
Heard -0.3935*  
 (0.1234)  
Two pot licenses 0.4491*  
 (0.1626)  
Instruments    
Distance 0.5576* -1.4150*  
 (0.2794) (0.4422)  
Within 35 miles -0.7679*  
 (0.2561)  
Inverse Mills 0.0718 -0.4626 
 (0.1835) (0.3596) 
Observations 1035 463 132 109 
*Significant < 10% level 
 
The variables of primary interest are those of the utility function.  Profits are 
inversely correlated with the probability of bidding in the auction, although the effect 
is not significant in Maryland.  The indicators for the importance of Family History 
and Bequest value are both significant in Maryland, and correspond to a decreased 
probability of bidding in the auction.  In Virginia, the importance of the joy of 
crabbing and Identity value both correspond to a significant decrease in the 
probability of bidding in the auction.  At this point there are no departures from 
expectations.  This is because without controlling for the value of the bid itself in the 
participation decision, we would expect a correlation between factors of utility and 
the decision to bid. 
The bid function provides insight into what individual characteristics are 
correlated with the licenses’ value.  The semilog specification of equation 2.17 means 




over the base value given a one unit increase in the independent variable.  The only 
significant indicators of utility are Profits, Mean Earnings, and Bequest in Maryland 
and Enjoy crabbing in Virginia.  Of interest is that the Mean Earnings variable 
corresponds to an increased license value, when theoretically a negative relationship 
should exist.  This might suggest household complementarities, in which the wife 
works to subsidize the husband in his fishing career (Binkley, 2000).  There does not 
seem to be selection bias in the bid equation, with the coefficient on the Inverse Mills 
ratio not significant at any conventional level.  
  
4.2 Parsimonious Bid Function 
Given that selection bias does not seem to be an issue the OLS estimation of a 
more parsimonious bid function is presented in Table 4.2.  Results, including 
insignificant point estimates, are presented in Table A.A.2 of Appendix A.  The Bid 
model specifications are an estimation of equation 2.17, while the WTA 
specifications substitute the natural log of an individual’s WTA values in place of the 
dependent variable in equation 2.17.  Point estimates can again be interpreted as the 
percent change in the dependent variable given a one unit change in the associated 
independent variable.  In the Maryland WTA specification the bequest motive is 
associated with just under a 30% increase in the value of a license; roughly equivalent 
to a $6,500 increase in expected annual profits.  Given survey respondents’ median 
annual profits of $220, this suggests that the bequest motive could correspond to a 
large portion of the license’s value for many individuals.  In Virginia the enjoyment 




effect of a $20,000 increase in annual profits, and again suggests non-monetary 
sources of utility could underlie the bulk of a license’s value for some individuals.  
 
Table 4.2: Parsimonious bid function estimation.  The Bid specification is an 
estimation of equation 2.17, while the WTA specification substitutes the natural 
log of WTA for the left hand side of equation 2.17 (standard error) 
Coefficient MD Bid MD WTA VA Bid VA WTA 
Constant -4.1543* -2.8138* -2.3664* -2.8014* 
(0.3803) (0.1273) (0.2010) (0.2017) 
Profits 0.3911* 0.4513* 0.2057* 0.1658* 
(0.2046) (0.0856) (0.1169) (0.0502) 
Probably crab 0.5389* 0.2836* 0.5963* 0.3940* 
(0.1726) (0.1177) (0.1877) (0.1550) 
Commercial 0.9089* 0.9419* 0.7368* 
(0.2463) (0.1955) (0.1473) 
Both rec. and comm.  0.6174* 0.1753* 
(0.1900) (0.0870) 
Mean earnings 0.9517* 
(0.5612) 
Age 0.6072* 0.4968* 
(0.1672) (0.0837) 




Enjoy crabbing 0.3564* 0.4394* 
(0.1723) (0.1138) 
Large pot license 0.6423* 0.8683* 
(0.1596) (0.1487) 
Wait list -0.7919* -0.3887* 
(0.2065) (0.1852) 
Mult holders at address  -0.7351* 
(0.2792) 
Peeler Pot License 0.5898* 
(0.1493) 
Non-crabbing license 0.4185* 
(0.1325) 
Observations 138 768 128 431 




4.3 Full Participation Decision Estimation 
Table 4.3 presents the primary results of this paper, the investigation of the 
decision to bid or not controlling for each individual’s predicted bid.  All model 
specifications estimate the conditional probability of bidding in the auctions through a 
probit framework.  In the linear specification the variables and parameters enter the 
standard normal cdf linearly, while the full model specifications are estimates of 
equation 2.12.  A specification including insignificant variables, once the optimal bid 
is controlled for in the model, is presented in Table A.A.3 of Appendix A. 
 
Table 4.3: Probit models of the participation decision, with an indicator for bid 
or not as dependent variable.  Bid amount measured in thousands of dollars for 
Maryland, and tens of thousands of dollars for Virginia (standard error) 
 MD Linear MD Full VA Linear VA Full 
Constant -1.2505* -1.3397* 0.8791* 0.4728 
 (0.2714) (0.2341) (0.3410) (0.3631) 
Demographics  
Stopped Crabbing 0.5587* 0.4626* 
 (0.1767) (0.1717) 
Latent 0.9594* 0.8919* 
 (0.1535) (0.1503) 
Probably Crab -0.3757* -0.3386*  -0.3842*
 (0.1544) (0.1541)  (0.1797) 
Commercial -0.4586* -0.4423* 
 (0.1717) (0.1703) 
Both Rec. and Comm. -0.5140* -0.5049* 
 (0.1456) (0.1452) 
Mult holders at address 0.6781* 0.6111* 
 (0.3478) (0.3506) 
Distance 0.5917* 0.6507* -1.1050* -1.1116*
 (0.2906) (0.2895) (0.4430) (0.4570) 
Within 35 miles   -0.5057* -0.6182*
    (0.2593) (0.2655) 
Non-crabbing licenses -0.5114* -0.4699*




Table 4.3 (continued): Probit models of the participation decision, with an 
indicator for bid or not as dependent variable.  Bid amount measured in 
thousands of dollars for Maryland, and tens of thousands of dollars for Virginia 
(standard error) 
 MD Linear MD Full VA Linear VA Full 
Utility indicators 
Bid amounta -0.1322 0.8332* -0.5103* 1.2553* 
 (0.0819) (0.2865) (0.1434) (0.5715) 
Bequest -0.3436* -2.7399* 
 (0.1271) (1.1094) 
Family History -0.2783*  
 (0.1472)  
Identity    0.9753 
   (0.6012) 
Enjoy crabbing -0.3502* -1.4736*
 (0.1507) (0.6961) 
Subjective Probability   
Late Reporting 0.4295* -0.8620* 
 (0.1566) (0.2362) 
High Education 0.3668* -0.4231* 
 (0.1252) (0.1953)   
Heard    -0.8252*
  (0.3003) 
Two pot licenses   1.5121* 
  (0.8321) 
Observations 743 743 390 390 
AIC 546.28 543.27 403.48 407.09 
*Significant < 10% level 
aWTA used in place of the predicted bid amount for the linear specifications. 
 
The point estimates for the demographic variables are relatively stable across 
specifications within each state, and are quite similar to the results of the probit 
estimated as part of the Heckman model.  Exceptions to the general agreement 
between specifications lie with the indicators of utility and variables of subjective 
probability.  The difference in magnitude and signs of the coefficients primarily stem 
from the differences in specifications themselves.  In Maryland the bid amount 
becomes statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and the indicator for family 




moving from the linear to the full model specification.  In Virginia, both indicators of 
subjective probability are significant in the full specification but not in the linear 
specification. 
In Maryland Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) suggests that the full 
model fits the data better than the linear specification, with the opposite true in 
Virginia.  The full model is the preferred specification given its theoretical basis and 
the ambiguity in terms of best fit between the two states.  I use the full model 
specification to derive the marginal effects discussed below. 
Given the optimal nature of the bid, a marginal increase in the bid amount 
should decrease the probability of bidding in the auction.  Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 
graph the actual marginal effects associated with bid values in each state against the 
respective individual’s WTA.  In both states these marginal effects vary both in 
magnitude and sign across observations.  The mean and median marginal effects are 
0.0028 and -0.0002 respectively in Maryland, with 72% of observations presenting a 
negative marginal effect.  Virginia has a similar trend, with mean and median 
marginal effects of 0.0150 and -0.00004 respectively, and 81% of individuals 
associated with a negative marginal effect.  In both states the positive marginal effects 
are associated the lowest relative WTA values, and are the first suggestion of 






Figure 4.1: Marginal effect of the bid amount on the probability of bidding in 






Figure 4.2: Marginal effect of the bid amount on the probability of bidding in 
Virginia’s auction, graphed against each individual’s WTA 
 
Theoretically you would expect to see the bid amount as the only significant 
determinant of utility in the model specification.  Instead, the indicators of a bequest 
value in Maryland and enjoyment value in Virginia are significantly correlated with 
the decision to bid in the auction, as is evident from Table 4.3.  Figure 4.3 and Figure 
4.4 graph the effect of these variables in the participation decision across WTA 
values.  The magnitude of the marginal effect is again greatest for those individuals 




value uncertainty for those individuals least engaged in the fishery.  This is 
particularly true given the previous findings of Table 4.2, which suggest that the 
bequest motive and the joy of crabbing could be associated with the majority of a 
license’s value for these individuals. 
 
Figure 4.3: Effect of indicating the importance of a bequest motive on the probability 






Figure 4.4: Effect of indicating the importance of enjoyment of crabbing on the 
probability of bidding in Virginia’s license auction 
 
4.4 Posted Offer Participation 
 
Further insight can be gained by investigating participation in Maryland’s 
posted price offer.  The participation decision for the posted offer should be a simple 
one.  If an individual’s WTA value is below the $2,260 offer, that individual should 
accept the posted offer.  Conversely, if the WTA value is above $2,260, the posted 





















































offer should be rejected.  However, seeming preference reversals between the auction 
and posted price offer indicate additional complexity in the decision. 
Table 4.4 presents probit models of the participation decisions surrounding the 
posted price offer.  Results including insignificant point estimates can be found in 
Appendix A, Table A.A.4.  Models 1 and 2 investigate the decision of whether to 
accept or reject the posted price, with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the 
individual accepted the offer and 0 otherwise.  Model 1 uses the raw WTA score 
submitted by individuals, while Model 2 uses a dummy variable equal to 1 if an 
individual’s submitted WTA value is below $2,260, and zero otherwise.  The 
remaining components of the two models are equal.  Parameter estimates are 
relatively consistent between the two models.  Theoretically the only variable which 
should be of importance here is the WTA value.  
A good portion of this incongruity could stem from the enforcement of 
additional restrictions on individuals classified as latent between the auction and 
posted price phases of the buyback.  As is to be expected, the coefficient on the latent 
classification is significant, and is associated with a median 22% increase in the 
probability of accepting the offer. 9  Conversely, an individual indicating they were 
very likely to crab in 2010 is associated with a 22% decrease in the probability of 
accepting the posted price, suggesting that an option value is an important motivator 
in the decision to sell a license.  The other large median marginal effect stems from 
the indicator for a bequest motive, with an associated 17% decrease in the probability 
                                                 
9 At median values all the marginal effects are significant at greater than the 1 percent level 
except WTA, Stopped Crabbing, Commercial, and Both rec. and comm., which are 
significant at greater than the 5% level.  All but the Latent, Stopped Crabbing, and Late 
Report coefficients are associated with a negative effect on the probability of taking the offer.  




of accepting the posted price offer.  Interestingly, the effect associated with late 
reporting is an increase of 6 percent, indicating that the more engaged an individual is 
in the fishery, the more likely they are to accept the posted price offer, all else being 
equal.  This additional evidence is consistent with the value uncertainty argument, in 
that potential participants are able to use the information provided by the posted price 
offer to update the expected value of their license. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Maryland probit models of the posted offer participation 
decision (standard error). WTA measured in $10,000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent variable Accepted Accepted Reversal Reversal 
Constant -0.7160* -1.1120* 0.8896* 0.8442* 
 (0.2582) (0.2601) (0.3101) (0.4703) 
Stopped Crabbing 0.5288* 0.5545*   
 (0.2076) (0.2055)   
Latent 0.9227* 1.0131*   
 (0.1615) (0.1602)   
Probably Crab -0.9008* -0.8240* -0.8188* -0.6969* 
 (0.1568) (0.1571) (0.2843) (0.3136) 
Commercial -0.6218* -0.6132* -0.6798*  
 (0.2039) (0.2006) (0.3588)  
Both Rec. and Comm. -0.5230* -0.5324* -0.5474*  
 (0.1574) (0.1555) (0.3075)  
Age -0.5315* -0.6081* -0.6955* -0.6811* 
 (0.1490) (0.1443) (0.2900) (0.3212) 
WTA -0.2385* 0.8375*  -1.9914* 
 (0.0766) (0.2779)  (0.5530) 
Bequest -0.7574* -0.7507* -0.6044*  
 (0.1441) (0.1423) (0.2758)  
Late Reporting 0.8871* 0.8929*  0.8442* 
 (0.1956) (0.1971)  (0.3906) 
Observations 768 768 108 100a 
*Significant < 10% level 
aDrops one individual who provided WTA > $50,000 but accepted 





Models 3 and 4 of Table 4.4 investigate those seeming preference reversals 
between the auction and posted offer.  The binary dependent variable in these two 
models takes a value of 1 if the individual bid above $2,260 in the auction and 
subsequently accepted the posted price of $2,260, and a value of 0 if the individual 
bid above $2,260 in the auction and rejected the posted price. 10  The only difference 
between Model 3 and Model 4 is whether the WTA is controlled for.  As can be seen 
from Model 4, the WTA is highly correlated with the preference reversal.  Calculated 
at the sample median, a marginal increase of $10,000 in WTA is associated with a 
79% decrease in the probability of exhibiting the reversal between the auction and 
posted price offer, an effect significant at greater than the 1 percent level.  An 
individual indicating they were very likely to crab in 2010 is associated with a median 
decrease of 24% in the probability of exhibiting the reversal.  Again, the more 
engaged individuals seem more likely to have made the reversal, with a median 28% 
increase in its probability if an individual’s late reporting decreased between 2008 
and 2009.  It thus seems that the reversals were made by individuals with relatively 
low beginning WTA values but relatively more engagement in the fishery, and low 
expectation of actually using the license in the coming year.   
4.5 Model Sensitivity 
 A number of assumptions regarding the model and data have the potential to 
greatly influence the analysis in this research.  In this section I explore the sensitivity 
of my results to some of the key assumptions made.     
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, the small number of observations for individuals bidding below $2,260 but 





4.5.1 Missing WTA Values 
 
 Approximately 30% of survey respondents in Maryland and 20% of 
respondents in Virginia did not provide WTA values.  Given the central role that 
WTA values play in my analysis I investigate the bias due to item non-response 
through the use of multiply-imputed (MI) datasets.  Rubin (1987) provides the 
canonical reference for MI as a manner to address missing data.  The strength of the 
MI process lies in its ability to specifically address the uncertainty due to imputations 
being modeled predictions and not observations.   In this analysis I employed a 
predicted means matching (PMM) algorithm using the MICE package (van Buuren & 
Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011) in R (R Development Core Team, 2011).  The PMM 
imputation process is outlined in Appendix B. 
Table 4.5 provides a comparison of the estimation of equation 2.12 for the 
complete case versus multiply-imputed datasets.  The complete case analyses are 
labeled MD CC and VA CC in the table, and utilize only those cases for which no 
missing data exist.  The MD MI and VA MI specifications are the results of the 
multiply imputed datasets, combined as outlined in Appendix B.  In both states the 
complete case and MI results correspond quite strongly.  Parameter signs are 
consistent across each state’s specifications.  Although some fluctuation in the point 
estimates occurs, both their magnitudes and significance levels are also relatively 
stable.  In Maryland the parameters of most interest, those associated with the bid 
amount and bequest value of the license, differ by 11 and 12 percent of the complete 
case estimate respectively.  In Virginia the bid amount, identity, and enjoy crabbing 




 Table 4.5: Probit models of the participation decision comparing 
complete case and Multiple Imputation analysis (standard error) 
 MD CC MD MI VA CC VA MI 
Constant -1.3397* -1.3901* 0.4728 0.3988 
 (0.2341) (0.2176) (0.3631) (0.3455) 
Demographics  
Stopped Crabbing 0.4626* 0.4889* 
 (0.1717) (0.1600) 
Latent 0.8919* 0.7619* 
 (0.1503) (0.1353) 
Probably Crab -0.3386* -0.4749* -0.3842* -0.4500*
 (0.1541) (0.1372) (0.1797) (0.1702) 
Commercial -0.4423* -0.3190* 
 (0.1703) (0.1540) 
Both Rec. and Comm. -0.5049* -0.3980*  
 (0.1452) (0.1337)  
Mult holders at address 0.6111* 0.6153* 
 (0.3506) (0.3020) 
Distance 0.6507* 0.5840* -1.1116* -1.1750*
 (0.2895) (0.2606) (0.4570) (0.4320) 
Within 35 miles   -0.6182* -0.7220*
    (0.2655) (0.2558) 
Non-crabbing licenses -0.4699* -0.3140*
 (0.1729) (0.1645) 
Utility indicators 
Bid amount 0.8332* 0.7404* 1.2553* 1.1670* 
 (0.2865) (0.2895) (0.5715) (0.0359) 
Bequest -2.7399* -2.4192* 
 (1.1094) (0.9934) 
Identity   0.9753 0.8071 
   (0.6012) (0.5764) 
Enjoy crabbing  -1.4736* -1.3148*
  (0.6961) (0.6809) 
Subjective Probability   
Late Reporting -0.8620* -0.9559* 
 (0.2362) (0.2520) 
High Education -0.4231* -0.4005*  
 (0.1953) (0.1937)   
Heard   -0.8252* -0.9603*
  (0.3003) (0.3375) 
Two pot licenses   1.5121* 1.5368* 
  (0.8321) (0.8870) 
Observations 743 1013 390 456 





Table 4.6 summarizes predicted versus actual participation decisions for 
Maryland and Virginia under the complete case and MI specifications.  All 
individuals with a predicted participation probability greater than 0.5 are predicted to 
bid, and all others as predicted to not bid in the auction.  The MI values are the 
average prediction across the five imputed dataset models.  The complete case 
specification predicts auction participation more accurately than the MI specification 
in Maryland, though there is no clear dominance in the Virginia models. 
 
Table 4.6: Predicted auction participation for the complete case 
versus Multiple Imputation specifications, in percentages 
 CC Predictions MI Predictions 
 Bid No Bid Bid No Bid 
MD Actual Bid 0.2437 0.7563 0.1413 0.8587 
MD Actual No Bid 0.0754 0.9246 0.0327 0.9673 
VA Actual Bid 0.2647 0.7353 0.2422 0.7578 
VA Actual No Bid 0.1563 0.8438 0.1230 0.8770 
 
Table 4.7 presents the differences in individual predicted outcomes between 
the complete case and multiply-imputed specifications.  In both states the 
participation probabilities and optimal bids predicted by each specification differs 
significantly as determined by a paired t-test for the equality of means (p = 0.0000) 
and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p = 0.0000).  However, the magnitude 
of the difference between predictions is very small.  The mean difference in predicted 
bids is less than 0.001 percent of the mean bids in both Maryland and Virginia.  In 
both states the complete case specification generally provides for larger predicted 





Table 4.7: Difference in predictions between complete case and Multiple 
Imputation specifications 
Prediction Difference Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
MD Optimal Bid ($) -0.18 0.12 -0.29 0.05 
MD Bid Probability (%) 1.24 2.34 -2.70 12.01 
VA Optimal Bid ($) -0.13 0.14 -0.33 0.019 
VA Bid Probability (%) 2.00 3.14 -7.17 13.14 
 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests between actual and predicted bids in Maryland 
indicate no significant difference for either the complete case or multiple imputation 
specifications, with p-values ~ 0.50 for both specifications.  The distributional 
equality of predicted and observed bids is statistically rejected at the five percent 
level in Virginia, with Wilcoxon signed-rank p-values ~ 0.02 for both specifications.  
However, the equality of medians is not rejected at any significant level using a two-
tailed sign test based off of the binomial distribution, with a p-value > 0.20 for both 
specifications.   
There is a strong similarity in the results of the complete case and MI 
specifications.  However, given that it provides for participation predictions and 
optimal bids at least as good as the MI specification, the complete case specification 
is preferred.        
 
4.5.2 Virginia’s Two Licenses  
A difference between the Maryland and Virginia buyback structure warrants 
discussion.  Whereas Maryland license holders had only one license eligible for the 
buyback, some Virginia license holders had both a hard pot and peeler pot license 




determined, and thus a joint distribution should be used to model them.  However, the 
overwhelming majority of individuals holding two licenses made the same decision 
for both, such that either two bids were submitted, or none at all.  For this reason, a 
bivariate probit model of the joint decision returns a correlation coefficient of 1, 
which suggests that estimating the joint decision provides no additional information 
regarding participation.  For this reason, a univariate probit was estimated in 
preceding sections, dropping those few individuals whose participation decision 
varied between the peeler and hard pot auctions and without any correction for the 
correlation between the participation decisions for dual license holders.  In order to 
investigate the sensitivity of my results to this uncontrolled correlation I compare the 
original specification to specifications that drop one of the two licenses for 
individuals holding both.   
Table 4.8 presents a comparison of Virginia’s estimation of equation 2.12, 
with the Full results representing the original specification, the Hard specification 
dropping the peeler license observations for individuals who have two eligible 
licenses, and the Peeler specification dropping the hard pot license observations for 
individuals who have two eligible licenses.  The point estimates in the Hard and 
Peeler specifications differ by an average of 28 percent and 35 percent of a standard 
deviation respectively from the Full specification.  The p-values tend to become 
larger as observations are dropped, as would be expected.  A notable exception is the 
indicator for the importance of identity in the value of a license, which is statistically 





Table 4.8: Virginia probit models of the auction participation 
decision investigating model sensitivity to uncontrolled correlation 
in the data (standard error) 
Selection Model Full Hard Peeler 
Constant 0.4728 0.1846 0.3273 
 (0.3631) (0.4070) (0.4170) 
Probably Crab -0.3842* -0.3480* -0.5004* 
 (0.1797) (0.2042) (0.2068) 
Non-crabbing licenses -0.4699* -0.4635* -0.3442* 
 (0.1729) (0.1918) (0.1969) 
Bid amount 1.2553* 1.2566* 1.1556* 
 (0.5715) (0.5085) (0.4715) 
Enjoy crabbing -1.4736* -1.4840* -1.4382* 
 (0.6961) (0.6759) (0.6729) 
Identity 0.9753 0.9899* 1.1060* 
 (0.6012) (0.5589) (0.5370) 
Heard -0.8252* -0.8460* -0.9006* 
 (0.3003) (0.2725) (0.2772) 
Two Pot licenses 1.5121* 1.3329* 1.8229 
 (0.8321) (0.7286) (1.2020) 
Within 35 mi -0.6182* -0.4294 -0.5614* 
 (0.2655) (0.2982) (0.3095) 
Total Distance -1.1116* -0.7675 -0.9234* 
 (0.4570) (0.5159) (0.5316) 
Observations 390 293 282 
*Significant < 10% level 
 
 
These results suggest no strong bias in the analysis due to uncontrolled 
correlation between observations for individuals holding two eligible licenses.  Given 
that the Hard and Peeler selection models use around 25 percent fewer observations 
than the Full specification, the Full specification is preferred.   
 
4.5.3 Unit Nonresponse 
Unit nonresponse, or the fact that 33 percent of individuals mailed in 




another source of bias with potential ramifications for my analysis.  A random sample 
of individuals that did not respond to the mail component of the survey were 
contacted by phone and asked a subsample of questions as a first step in gauging 
whether unit nonresponse poses an issue.  A total of 61 mail nonrespondents 
responded to the Maryland phone survey and 56 mail nonrespondents responded to 
the Virginia phone survey. 
Table 4.9 presents the results of tests for equalities of responses from the mail 
and phone components of the survey.  In Maryland both age and the frequency with 
which individuals self-reported being commercial watermen differ between mail 
respondents and phone respondents.  The phone respondents are significantly older 
and more likely to self-report as commercial.  In Virginia, the frequency with which 
individuals self-report both being commercial and the importance of an identity value 
associated with the license, as well as the WTA for peeler pot licenses, differ 
significantly between the mail and phone respondents.  Phone respondents are 
significantly more likely to self-report as a commercial waterman, are less likely to 
state the importance of identity, and have significantly higher WTA values for peeler 
licenses than mail respondents.  These results suggest that, although most of the 
variables are similar across populations, some potential for nonresponse bias at the 





Table 4.9: P-values for tests of equality between mail and phone survey 
responses.  Dichotomous variable comparisons are two-tailed t-tests for 
the frequency of positive responses.  Continuous variable comparisons 
are Mann-Whitney U tests for the equality of the distribution 
Variables Maryland Virginia 
Categorical Variables   
Commercial 0.0026 0.0952 
Probably Crab 0.3251 0.1794 
Mult holders at address* 0.8081 0.6006 
Stopped Crabbing* 0.1470  
Latent* 0.1486  
Both rec. and comm. 0.1498  
Late Reporting* 0.8514  
Bequest 0.1243  
High Education 0.8866  
Identity  0.0025 
Peeler Pot License*  0.6554 
Enjoy Crabbing  0.1888 
Peeler Wait List*  0.9983 
Hard Wait List*  0.8832 
Within 35 mi*  0.4219 
Two Pot licenses*  0.9446 
Non-crabbing licenses*  0.8860 
Large pot license*  0.8941 
Continuous variables   
Age* 0.0222  
Profits* 0.9708  
WTA 0.6486  
Total Distance* 0.1442 0.5737 
Peeler WTA  0.0539 
Hard WTA  0.2018 
Hard Profits*  0.6840 
Peeler Profits*  0.4355 
Ratio*  0.9997 
*Observed for everyone eligible for the buybacks 
 
Although some of the data used in this paper is available only for survey 
respondents, there are a large number of variables which are available for all 
individuals who were eligible for the buybacks in Maryland and Virginia, and some 




Table 4.10 presents the results of a logistic regression which further 
investigates potential nonresponse bias in the analysis by identifying which variables 
are significantly correlated with unit nonresponse.  Table A.A.5 in Appendix A 
provides model results including insignificant point estimates.  The dependent 
variable is an indicator equal to one if an individual responded to the survey, and zero 
otherwise.  The average licenses variable is the average number of non-crabbing 
licenses held by each individual over the 13 years of harvest data available for 
Maryland license holders.  The bid variable is an indicator equal to one if an 
individual bid in the auction and zero otherwise.  Personal and Retail are the 
percentages of the harvest respectively held for personal use or sold to a retailer, 
averaged over the harvest history of an individual.  The Buyback variable is an 
indicator equal to one if an individual accepted the fixed price offer, and zero 
otherwise.  The number of years fished is the total number of years within the harvest 
history in which the individual actively crabbed.  All other variables are as previously 
defined. 
It is apparent from Table 4.10 that individuals who responded to the survey 
differ significantly from those who did not respond to the survey.  Further, the 
differences are in variables which are likely to be important to the participation 
decisions that are the primary interest of this paper.  Of note is that the majority of the 
variables which differ between the two groups are consistent with the observed 
differences between mail and phone respondents.  The Personal, Retail, Number of 
years fished, and Average licenses are likely to be strongly correlated with whether an 




the estimate for the propensity to respond to the mail survey in Maryland.  In 
addition, the Distance, Latent, Stopped Crabbing, and Mult holders at address 
variables are significant in the propensity to respond to the mail survey, although they 
were not found to be significantly different between the mail and phone respondents.  
Likelihood ratio tests suggest that the Stopped Crabbing and Latent variables are 
jointly, though not independently, significant.  I have previously shown that profits 
are significantly correlated with WTA values, and thus controlling for profits in the 
propensity model should help control for differences in this variable.  The identity 
value indicator is the one variable for which no obvious control exists. 
 
 
Table 4.10: Logit regressions of the response to the mail survey, with the 
dependent variable equaling one if an individual responded to the mail 
survey and zero otherwise (standard error) 
Selection Model Maryland Virginia 
Constant -0.4190* -1.4542* 
 (0.1922) (0.0907) 
Average licenses -0.2661*  
 (0.0684)  
Bid 0.3285*  
 (0.1235)  
Personal 0.0029*  
 (0.0014)  
Retail 0.0123*  
 (0.0057)  
Age -0.4970*  
 (0.0726)  
Buyback -0.6556*  
 (0.1196)  
Distance 0.3596*  
 (0.1670)  
Stopped Crabbing -0.2035*  
 (0.1065)  
Latent -0.1760  
 (0.1146)  
Number of years fished 0.0240* 0.1001* 




Table 4.10 (continued): Logit regressions of the response to the mail 
survey, with the dependent variable equaling one if an individual 
responded to the mail survey and zero otherwise (standard error) 
Selection Model Maryland Virginia 
Mult holders at address -0.4791* -0.4932* 
 (0.2037) (0.1685) 
Profits  -0.1129* 
  (0.0517) 
Observations 3588 1772 
Model Likelihood Ratio 0.0000 0.0000 
*Significant at < 10% level 
  
The above analysis suggests that nonresponse bias could present an issue.  I 
undertook MI analysis in order to further investigate this issue, creating imputations 
for each individual with missing observations.  Imputation methods, along with 
results of the MI analysis can be found in Appendices B and C.  Rubin (1987) 
provides a simple calculation for the fraction of an estimate’s information missing, 
,due to nonresponse.   This formula is 
/
, with 1  
representing the relative increase in variance due to nonresponse,  equaling the 
between imputation variance and  the within imputation variance, and  equal to 
the parameter’s calculated degrees of freedom.  Exact definitions for , , and  
can be found in Appendix B.  The fraction of missing information calculated in this 
manner is extremely large for both Maryland and Virginia.  For example, the average 
missing fraction of information in Maryland’s bid function is 0.69 percent, while in 
Virginia this average is 0.59.  Thus, the majority of the simulation variance is 
generated between imputations.   
The survey which generated the nonresponse was specifically targeted 
towards gathering information on WTA, and the variables most likely to correlate to 




a bequest motive and identity value are strong enough in order to provide valid 
imputations, in stark contrast to the WTA item nonresponse issue.  Coupled with the 
significant amount of information missing due to nonresponse, any correction to the 
complete case estimation seems haphazard.  For this reason, although I acknowledge 
that nonresponse bias could be an issue in this analysis I do not correct for it in the 
estimations11.      
 
4.6 Hypothetical Bias 
An obvious question is how well the hypothetical WTA data represents the 
unobserved license values underlying actual bidding decisions in the Maryland and 
Virginia auctions.  In this section I investigate the convergent validity of the data in 
order to answer this question statistically.  Convergent validity is the statistical 
comparison of two variables which purport to represent the same underlying value.  
In this analysis I will directly compare the actual bids and hypothetical WTA values 
in order to understand whether they converge in their statistical representation of 
individuals’ actual license values. 
Table 4.11 compares the actual bid and hypothetical WTA data for those 
individual who both submitted a bid in their respective auctions and WTA values 
                                                 
11 I also estimated an inverse propensity score weighted (IPW) regression to investigate the 
potential bias due to nonresponse, with the results presented in Appendix D.  The IPW uses 
the inverse predicted propensity to respond to the mail survey, generated from the logit model 
of Table 4.10 to weight each individual’s response in order to represent the underlying 
population.  Point estimates were very similar to the unweighted complete case specification.  
However, both the IPW estimator and the MI specification provided for conditional WTA 
values significantly smaller than the unweighted complete case specification.  In Maryland 
the mean nonresponse bias is calculated at roughly 2.5% of the OLS estimate, or $250, while 




through the survey.  In Maryland and Virginia, between 20 and 36 percent of 
respondents submitted WTA values greater than their actual bid values, suggesting 
some potential for hypothetical bias.   However, upon closer inspection these numbers 
are not as troubling as they might first appear for the following reasons. 
   
 
Table 4.11: Difference between actual bids and hypothetical WTA 
values for individuals submitting both 
Maryland  Virginia 
Full Outliers Removed  Peeler Hard 
Observations 131 128  49 82 
Mean ($) -1,044 900  400 25,067 
Median ($) 0 0  0 2,000 
SD ($) 25,363 4,639  23,626 50,483 
Inconsistent (%) 36 35  19 22 
 
First, both the mean and median differences in Virginia are consistent with 
theoretical expectations.  Though the median difference in Maryland is consistent 
with expectations, the mean score is not.  However, 23 of the 47 individuals who 
provided WTA values above their original bids in Maryland had bids below the 
$2,260 posted offer price.  Given the common value component of the licenses, and 
the nature of the information revealed through Maryland’s posted offer price, it is 
logical for these individuals to have updated their WTA values in a positive direction 
after the buyback.  Second, after discarding the three individuals whose difference 
between actual bid and WTA values were greater than two standard deviations away 
from the mean, and thus could be argued to be protest responses, the distribution of 
differences in Maryland becomes much better aligned with expectations.  Third, the 




0.8833, suggesting a very strong linear correlation between the two, as would be 
theoretically expected.  The correlation coefficient for the pooled licenses in Virginia 
is 0.7382, which also very high.  Interestingly, hard pot licenses seem to correspond 
with much higher amounts of bid shading than peeler licenses in Virginia. 
  Section 4.5.1 statistically compares predicted optimal bids with actual bids in 
the auction, with mixed results.  Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test Maryland’s 
predicted and actual bids are not significantly different at any conventional level, 
while Virginia’s are (p-values of 0.5174 and 0.0210 respectively).   Figure 4.5 graphs 
the predicted and actual bids in Virginia.  The predicted bids are tightly grouped 
around the 45 degree line for the lower end of the distribution.  However, at the upper 
end of the distribution the predictions tend to be significantly smaller than the actual 
bids.  This suggests that the model is much better at controlling for bid shading at the 






Figure 4.5: Predicted versus actual bids in Virginia 
 
In Table 4.2 we had previously estimated the bid function of equation 2.17 
using both the actual bid and hypothetical WTA values.  In Table 4.12 we revisit 
these estimations holding the observations to only those individuals who both bid in 
the auction and provided WTA values.  This is done to further investigate whether 
hypothetical bias is a concern in the analysis.  The average difference between point 
estimates in Maryland is 1.05 standard deviations12, while in Virginia it is 1.03 
standard deviations.  The Wait List (2.40 SE), Peeler (1.38 SE), and Constant (1.89 
SE) parameters provide the greatest differences between specifications in Virginia, 
                                                 



























while in Maryland the Age (1.70 SE), Commercial (2.01 SE), and Both rec. and 
comm. (1.63 SE) parameters differ most.   
 
Table 4.12: Comparison of regression results for actual and predicted bids 
(robust standard error) 
Maryland  Virginia 
Coefficient Bid WTA  Bid WTA 
Constant -4.2548* -3.8769*  -2.2524* -2.7180*
(0.4105) (0.4315)  (0.2466) (0.2063) 
Profits 0.3958* 0.4209*  0.1536* 0.1911* 
(0.1806) (0.1625)  (0.0556) (0.0428) 
Mean earnings 1.0877* 0.5351  
(0.5729) (0.5276)  
Age 0.4932* 0.2380*  
(0.1503) (0.1400)  
Bequest 0.2311 0.3946*  
(0.1678) (0.1598)  
Commercial 0.9402* 0.4399*  0.9089* 0.8077* 
(0.2495) (0.2222)  (0.2244) (0.2079) 
Both rec. and comm. 0.7842* 0.4582*  
(0.1996) (0.1757)  
Probably crab 0.4658* 0.4835*  0.5509* 0.5980* 
(0.1697) (0.1439)  (0.2036) (0.2201) 
Large pot license  0.7515* 0.7934* 
 (0.2091) (0.1931) 
Wait list  -0.9684* -0.4931*
 (0.1982) (0.2385) 
Peeler Pot License  0.0396 0.3331* 
 (0.2125) (0.1961) 
Observations 124 124  120 120 
R-squared 0.386 0.271  0.560 0.474 
Prob.  > F 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
*Significant at < 10% level 
 
Where the models do seem to differ substantially in Maryland, the Bid 
specification suggests a larger effect than the WTA estimate.  This results in a larger 




shading is not controlled for completely by the parameters of the subjective 
probability, and some residual shading is correlated with the Age, Commercial and 
Both rec. and comm. parameters.  There is thus no apparent support for hypothetical 
bias in the Maryland specifications. 
In Virginia, the differences in the Wait List and Peeler parameter estimates 
could again suggest differences in the bid shading for these individuals when 
compared to other participants.  This is plausible given the different manner in which 
the bid rankings were conducted for waitlisted individuals in comparison with full 
time and part time classifications, and the evidence from Table 4.11. 13  The 
difference in constant estimates provides for a larger baseline value in the Bid 
specification when compared to the WTA specification and does not provide an 
indication of hypothetical bias. 
A comparison of actual and hypothetical results for individuals who provide 
both thus suggests that hypothetical bias is not a major concern.  Where the data do 
diverge, the actual values are consistently larger than their hypothetical counterparts, 
which is theoretically expected when comparing bids and WTA values if shading is 
imperfectly controlled for.      
                                                 
13 The waitlisted bids were divided by the maximum number of pots that individual’s license 
allows, whereas the full time and part time bids were divided by the maximum number of 




Chapter 5:  Buyback Simulations 
 The imputations in section 4.5.3 do not provide reliable results for the 
statistical analysis of the bid formulation and auction participation models.  However, 
as Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations, the imputations provide an 
opportunity to compare alternative auction outcomes under different market designs 
and with full participation.  This allows investigation into the variation in simulations 
and comparisons of simulated and observed market outcomes in order to gauge the 
overall impact of low participation. 
 A first best outcome is defined here as one in which the state buys the largest 
number of licenses possible with the available budget.  This first best outcome occurs 
when individuals accept their WTA in exchange for their license, under the specific 
rules of the auction, and everyone participates, or is amenable to sell.  In the 
simulations I compare these first best outcomes against observed outcomes, in order 
to better understand the impact of low participation rates on buyback results. 
 In all simulations 1,000 MI draws are made for each missing WTA 
observation, as outlined in Appendix B and C.  These imputations are undertaken in 
the exact same manner as section 4.5.3, with the added step that all missing variables 
of the WTA function were imputed, not just the WTA.  These variables are imputed 





5.1 Maryland Simulations 
The major drawback of using a posted price offer to buy licenses stems from 
the fact that the price can easily lead to outcomes that diverge from management 
objectives and expectations.  In Maryland’s case, the $2,260 price lead to 646 
individuals selling their licenses for a total expenditure of $1,459,960.  However, the 
DNR only expended 49% of their available $3 million budget.  This money could 
have been used to buy back additional licenses, and further decrease the management 
uncertainty induced by latent effort.  I use the simulations to understand how far from 
a first best outcome the observed results lay.   
In section 5.1.1 I simulate the number of licenses which could have been 
bought with the $1,459,960 under the assumptions of full participation and 
individuals bidding their WTA.  The simulations in 5.1.1 give a sense as to how well 
the MI WTA values are characterizing the actual WTA values underlying 
participation decisions.  In section 5.1.2 I then look at the total number of licenses 
which could have been bought with the entire $3 million budget, again assuming full 
participation and individuals receiving their WTA value in exchange for their license.  
This provides an understanding of the maximum number of licenses which could 
have realistically been bought given Maryland’s available budget.   
 
5.1.1 Simulation Under $1,459,960 Budget 
 
Figure 5.1 provides results of the simulation, which indicate that an average of 




deviation.  This is 94% of the actual 646 licenses bought, which suggests some 
inflation of the MI WTA over true values.  However, only 3,592 individuals were 
simulated out of the total 3,676 population eligible for the auction.  The 84 
individuals not simulated bought the licenses after the buyback were announced.  As 
previously stated these individuals were excluded from the analysis in order to avoid 
potential issues dealing with individuals who obtained a license solely to bid in the 
auction.   
 





 Given these results, the simulated WTA values are conservative, in that they 
are somewhat larger than would be expected given the observed outcomes.  This 
suggests that the simulations with the full $3 million budget should also provide 
conservative predictions on the number of licenses which could be bought under a 
first best scenario.   
  
 
5.1.2 Simulation Under Full $3 Million Budget 
 Figure 5.2 graphs the number of licenses bought in each iteration of the 
simulation.  By expending the entire $3 million budget, the mean simulation allowed 
for 1007 licenses to be bought back, with a 23.47 standard deviation. 
These simulations suggest that the actual posted offer fell far short of a first 
best scenario.  The 646 licenses represent 64% of the total licenses which could have 
been bought given full participation and total budget expenditure, even in what are 
likely conservative simulations.  This result clearly underscores the issue faced by 
fishery managers in Maryland.  An auction format is much more efficient, but only if 
bidding rates approach full participation.  In reality the 646 licenses bought back from 
the posted price offer using $1,459,960 greatly exceeds the 470 licenses which could 
have been bought if the original auction had been honored, and all $3 million was 
expended.  These simulations highlight the importance of the participation rate as a 






Figure 5.2: Maryland simulation of first best outcomes under $3 million budget 
 
 
5.2 Virginia Simulations 
 Having followed through with the auctions as original designed; Virginia’s 
problem was the opposite of Maryland’s.  Whereas Maryland’s posted price offer 
induced additional participation but failed to expend the budget, Virginia’s 




Section 5.2.1 contrasts Virginia’s actual auction outcomes against a first best scenario 
under the implemented market design.  Section 5.2.2 then contrasts these results with 
a simulation which ranks by bid per pot, but does not differentiate between the Wait 
List, Part Time, and Full Time classifications of the actual auction.   
 
5.2.1 Simulations Under Actual Market Design 
 Figure 5.3 presents the first best simulations of Virginia’s buybacks under the 
actual buyback rules. The rules ranked licenses by a bid amount per pot day (bid 
divided by the product of the average number of days fished and the license’s 
maximum allowable pots) for the full time and part time classifications, and bid per 
pot (bid divided by the license’s maximum allowable pots) for wait listed individuals.  
The budget was divided between license classifications in the exact manner as the 
actual buyback, with the full time, part time, and wait list classifications respectively 






Figure 5.3: Virginia first best buyback simulation under actual auction rules 
 
The simulations average 242 wait listed (16.13 sd), 121 full time (7.40 sd), 
and 197 part time (11.40 sd) licenses bought back with available funds, for a total of 
560 licenses.  The 359 licenses actually bought back in the auction represents 64% of 
the potential licenses which could have been bought with full participation in the 
auction.  The actual auction retired 75,441 licensed crab pots, for a 20% reduction in 
potential gear capacity.  The simulated first best results remove an average of 123,071 




results again suggest that specific attention must be paid in designing markets that 
minimize participation costs, and maximize participation rates, in order to effectively 
and efficiently attain management goals. 
 
5.2.2 Uncategorized Simulations 
Virginia’s auction format specifically targeted active effort.  A sizeable 
portion of the budget was used to buy the licenses of individuals who ultimately re-
entered the fishery.  This final simulation investigates what total potential effort could 
have been removed from the fishery if the prioritization of active watermen’s licenses 
was not part of the market design.  In this uncategorized simulation, it is assumed that 
the manager’s objective is to remove the largest amount of potential effort from the 
fishery given their budget constraint.  As such, bids are ranked on a dollar per pot 
basis, and licenses are bought from lowest to highest ranking until the entire budget 
of $6,725,160.93 is expended.  Thus, in terms of priority no weight is given on the 
full time, part time, and wait list classifications. 
Figure 5.4 graphs the results of the uncategorized simulations.  These results 
can be thought of as the maximum potential effort that could have been retired from 
the fishery given Virginia’s budget, versus the actual auction design that prioritized 
the removal of active licenses.  The average number of licenses retired through these 
simulations is 771 (30.16 sd), a 115% increase over the 359 licenses actually bought, 
and 38% greater than the simulations of section 5.2.1.  The average total number of 




actual number of licenses retired through the auction as it was implemented, and 28% 
more pots than the simulations of 5.2.1.   
 
Figure 5.4: Simulated Virginia buyback putting no priority on license categories 
 
5.3 Discussion of Simulation Results 
The results of the simulation clearly highlight the central role played by 
participation decisions in the Maryland and Virginia auction outcomes.  In both states 




the low end of the WTA distribution, severely hindered the effectiveness of the 
buybacks.  Maryland was able to partially address this issue by switching to a posted 
price offer, which induced additional participation within the lower tail of the WTA 
distribution.  However, Maryland’s posted price buyback utilized only 49% of the 
available budget, meaning the 646 licenses actually bought back represents roughly 
64% of the total which could have been bought back with a more efficient outcome. 
 In Virginia both the low participation rate of individuals in the lower tail of 
the WTA distribution and the categorization and prioritization used to target active 
licenses severely decreased the total potential effort, in the form of licensed pots, 
which could have been removed.  The VMRC faces management challenges which 
are not considered in this research, which lead to the prioritization of active effort.  
However, 24% of Virginia’s total budget, or $1,614,315, was used to acquire licenses 
from individuals who promptly reentered the fishery.  A number of individuals who 
re-entered the fishery had a single license prior to the buyback, but bought two 
licenses upon re-entry.  This evidence suggests that, as implemented, the Virginia 
license was ineffective in reducing active effort.  Removing the maximum number of 
potential pots from the fishery using the given budget could well have served as a 





Chapter 6:  Discussion 
 
In both states the value uncertainty interpretation finds support through all 
steps of my analysis.  A consistent argument is that value uncertainty was a major 
issue in the auction, leading to low participation rates and high variability in the bids 
tendered.  This uncertainty could have stemmed from numerous sources including the 
thin alternative market for licenses and the outstanding policy initiatives.  The switch 
to the posted price format in Maryland provided additional information to license 
holders; both through the announcement of the posted price offer itself, and what 
Maryland deemed a fair market value for the license, and through the implementation 
of additional restrictions on those individuals classified as latent.  The more engaged 
an individual, the more likely these signals were used to update the expected value of 
their license, all else being equal. 
This difference in updating between individuals with low and high WTA 
values has a logical explanation in the nature of the value stemming from the license 
itself, which is a mix of common and private values.  The profits which can be 
generated from selling the license on the open market should serve as a lower bound 
for WTA values.  For individuals with relatively low WTA values this common value 
could easily comprise the bulk of the license’s value, along with more amorphous 
values than current license usage.  However, the open market for these licenses is 
thin, and clearing prices are not general public knowledge.  A strong signal on the 
common value component of the license would provide a great deal of information.  
At relatively higher WTA values, the bulk of the license’s value stems primarily from 




more likely to be used in updating by individuals with low starting WTA values, for 
which the common value component of the license is relatively more important.  This 
description holds with the findings of Milgrom and Weber (1982), who espouse the 
full reporting of available information about the common value component of the 
auctioned item in mixed common-private value settings and first price auctions, in 
order to increase efficiency and decrease the effect of the winner’s curse.  Groves and 
Squires (2007) similarly suggest the important role common information plays in the 
efficiency of the price formation process for fishery buybacks, although the 
magnitude of this inefficiency is not specifically investigated or detailed.  
Given that an individual’s WTA value is significantly correlated with 
engagement in the fishery, as judged by historical profits, future expected usage, self-
classification, etc., these results suggest that marginally engaged crabbers could face 
difficulty in formulating bids.  Marginally engaged individuals are often targeted for 
this type of policy intervention, which suggests that additional care in the design and 
execution of the intervention is warranted.  For buybacks, this additional care could 
include a dry-run of the auction as suggested by Groves and Squires (2007), much in 
the manner of practice rounds in experimental economics.   
Alternatively, an auction format designed specifically to address problems in 
the bid formulation process could facilitate participation in buyback auctions.  As an 
example, DePiper et al. (2011) tested what they termed a facilitated auction in an 
experimental setting.  This facilitated auction draws attention to the most salient 
issues in the bid formulation process by asking potential participants to consider the 




amount of money they believe the auctioneer will pay for the item.  The auction 
instructions then suggest that the individual’s bid should fall somewhere between 
these two values, and implicitly focuses attention on the trade-off between the 
probability of and profits from winning the auction.  By walking through the steps of 
formulating a bid, this design specifically addresses issues stemming from 
unfamiliarity with the auction format, much in the same manner as practice rounds. 
The inefficiency due to nonparticipation also lend more weight to license 
auctions of the form proposed by Garber and Bromley (2003), who suggest that 
fishermen should tender bids to purchase the right to stay in the fishery, as opposed to 
the state buying licenses and capital from fishermen.  Although this could prove 
politically problematic, Garber and Bromley’s policy instrument has the benefit of 
ensuring participation from everyone wanting to remain active in a fishery.  This 
would mitigate any allocation inefficiencies directly due to decreased participation 
rates.  This type of auction has been implemented in Chilean fisheries including the 
Squat Lobster (Pleuroncodes monodon), yellow prawn (Cervimundia johni), black 
cod (Dissostichus eleginoides), and orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus) (Cerda-
D’Amico & Urbina-Véliz, 2000), among others. 
More generally, market information could play a decisive role in buyback 
participation decisions.  The reversals associated with Maryland’s change from an 
auction to a posted price offer suggest that individuals incorporated new information 
into their decision-making process between the two market designs.  A strong signal 
from the Maryland DNR on the fair market value of a license seems to have played a 




theory for mixed private and common value goods.  In Maryland, the proposed 
regulations faced by individuals classified as latent most assuredly complicated the 
participation decision for those individuals, and this source of uncertainty should have 
been addressed prior to initiating the auction. 
The most likely reason that this value uncertainty translated into lower auction 
participation rates for marginally engaged fishermen is the increased costs of 
information gathering for these individuals.  The value of their licenses tend to be 
generated not from current usage, but more amorphous sources such as a bequest 
value or expected future usage which differs significantly from past usage patterns.  
One could easily imagine that these individuals lack the social networks which would 
facilitate an understanding of the current economic reality of the fishery and its future 
outlook.  The results indicate that expected usage patterns and alternative sources of 
utility must be understood when ex-ante values are generated for auction design and 
budgeting purposes.  These results are also consistent with List’s (2003) finding that 
market experience attenuates anomalies in field experiments. 
Simulations of alternative outcomes suggest that the number of licenses 
actually bought represent between 47% and 64% of what could have been bought 
with higher participation rates.  Likewise, the total licensed pots removed represent 
between 48% and 64% of the most efficient outcomes in each state.  The magnitude 
of these results indicates that the low auction participation rates severely impacted 
each state’s ability to achieve stated management goals.    
The underlying issues highlighted in this paper could extend to the design of 




Generally, ITQ systems assign what amounts to individual property rights over a 
fraction of the total allowable harvest in a fishery.  Fishermen are then free to harvest 
their individual quota at any time throughout the season, or to trade it to others.  This 
market-based approach should provide efficiency gains over both open access and 
limited access management regimes.  However, my analysis suggests that transaction 
costs likely exist, in the form of information search costs.  These costs could hamper 
the efficiency of the ITQ system.  For example, the speed and extent of efficiency 
gains could correlate negatively with the quantity of quota provided to individuals 
least prepared to undertake the trades necessary for efficiency to be achieved.  The 
results of this paper suggest that initial allocation could be an important concern for 
fishery managers when transitioning to an ITQ system and this potential warrants 
additional investigation.  The potential for this type of inefficiency could warrant 
additional research into the role of quota brokerage services, such as implemented by 
the Australian South East Trawl Fishery (Fox, Grafton, Kompas, & Che, 2007). 
The research within this dissertation could also explain similar intransigence 
observed in the agricultural sector.  Like fishing, small scale and family run 
agricultural enterprises have long been viewed as an important contributor to rural 
culture and society, beyond their profit-generating potential (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2002).  Direct subsidies (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002; Ilbery et al., 2009; Internal Revenue Service, 2010), tax breaks 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2010), and payment programs aimed at inducing farm exit 
(Botterill, 2001) have all looked to influence the entry and exit decisions surrounding 




in the face of negative profits, and non-pecuniary factors of utility have been cited 
reasons for this exit inertia (Hoppe et al., 2010; Jack et al., 2009).  The optimality of 
policies aimed at these entry and exit decisions relies not only on understanding the 
magnitude of the value generated from these enterprises, but also whether value 





APPENDIX A: Results Including Insignificant Estimates  
Table A.A.1 presents the Heckman selection model of Table 4.1, retaining 
insignificant parameter estimates.  The results suggest that most of the value 
indicators correspond to insignificant point estimates.  The exceptions are the Bequest 
and Family History indicators and Mean Earnings in Maryland, and the Enjoy 
Crabbing indicator and Profits in Virginia.  Significant point estimates are consistent 
with those presented in Table 4.1. 
 
Table A.A.1: Heckman selection models estimating auction participation and 
bid function, including insignificant point estimates (standard error) 
 Selection model Bid function 
 Maryland Virginia Maryland Virginia 
Constant -2.2426* -0.4067 -4.3195* -2.2177* 
 (0.4060) (0.4803) (0.4276) (0.5493) 
Demographics    
Age -0.1253  0.6802* 
 (0.1163)  (0.1698) 
Stopped Crabbing 0.5288*  -0.1723 
 (0.1633)  (0.2542) 
Latent 0.7754*  -0.2757 
 (0.1377)  (0.2000) 
Probably Crab -0.4615* -0.6067* 0.4063* 0.6636* 
 (0.1364) (0.1957) (0.1845) (0.2678) 
Commercial -0.2880* 0.5398 1.0477* 0.7644* 
 (0.1677) (0.3341) (0.2493) (0.4513) 
Both Rec. and Comm. -0.3856* 0.4161 0.6780* -0.0442 
 (0.1326) (0.3535) (0.1920) (0.4601) 
Mult holders at address 0.6424* -0.0744 0.7176 -0.6575* 
 (0.3046) (0.2394) (0.5554) (0.3029) 
Full Time 0.1344  0.6184* 
 (0.2562)  (0.2848) 
Wait List -0.2236  -0.2901 
 (0.2247)  (0.2562) 
Non-crabbing license  -0.2774*  0.4544* 
  (0.1676)  (0.2299) 
Large pot license  0.1869  0.7898* 
  (0.1532)  (0.1726) 




Table A.A.1 (continued): Heckman selection models estimating auction 
participation and bid function, including insignificant point estimates 
(standard error) 
 Selection model Bid function 
 Maryland Virginia Maryland Virginia 
Profits -0.0164 -0.2434* 0.1664 0.1810 
 (0.1231) (0.0993) (0.2582) (0.1450) 
Mean Earnings 0.0398  1.3815* 
 (0.4296)  (0.5712) 
Family History -0.2348* -0.1842 0.1371 -0.0136 
 (0.1326) (0.1616) (0.1977) (0.2094) 
Identity -0.1443 -0.1995 -0.2002 -0.2365 
 (0.1224) (0.1579) (0.1867) (0.2014) 
Bequest -0.3793* 0.2501 0.3054* 0.0335 
 (0.1145) (0.1679) (0.1777) (0.2069) 
Enjoy crabbing -0.1057 -0.4902* 0.2459 0.4587* 
 (0.1195) (0.1511) (0.1736) (0.2173) 
Subjective Probability    
Late Reporting -3.1289*  
 (0.9488)  
High Education -2.2521*  
 (0.7421)   
Heard -0.4064*   
 (0.1235)   
Two pot licenses 0.4144*   
 (0.1573)   
Instruments    
Distance 0.5852* -1.4370*  
 (0.2800) (0.4475)  
Within 35 miles -0.8110*  
 (0.2597)  
Inverse Mills 0.0954 -0.4050 
 (0.1834) (0.3626) 
Observations 1035 463 132 109 
*Significant < 10% level 
 
  Table A.A.2 details the models of Table 4.2, retaining insignificant point 
estimates.  Estimates are consistent with Table 4.2, though Mean Earnings and Profits 






Table A.A.2: Parsimonious bid function estimation of Table 4.2, including 
insignificant point estimates (standard error) 
Coefficient MD Bid MD WTA VA Bid VA WTA 
Constant -4.0137* -2.7772* -2.5105* -2.7814* 
(0.4095) (0.2359) (0.2316) (0.2018) 
Profits 0.3690* 0.4054* 0.1885 0.1664* 
(0.2061) (0.0905) (0.1186) (0.0502) 
Probably crab 0.5047* 0.2342* 0.5353* 0.4168* 
(0.1766) (0.1191) (0.2100) (0.1556) 
Commercial 0.8766* 0.2026 0.9089* 0.7389* 
(0.2489) (0.1313) (0.2009) (0.1471) 
Both rec. and comm.  0.5986* 0.2944* 
(0.1912) (0.1063) 
Mean earnings 0.8975 -0.1795 
(0.5645) (0.3041) 
Age 0.5984* 0.4391* 
(0.1675) (0.0852) 
Bequest 0.3627* 0.2821* 
(0.1731) (0.0865) 
Latent -0.1611 -0.3356* 
(0.1734) (0.1067) 
Enjoy crabbing 0.3681* 0.4598* 
(0.1730) (0.1145) 
Large pot license 0.7775* 0.8540* 
(0.2008) (0.1488) 
Wait list -0.7755* -0.3934* 
(0.2074) (0.1849) 
Mult holders at address  -0.7220* -0.2688 
(0.2803) (0.1822) 
Peeler Pot License 0.1939 0.5831* 
(0.2040) (0.1491) 
Non-crabbing license 0.1527 0.4035* 
(0.1860) (0.1327) 
Observations 138 759 128 431 
*Significant < 10% level 
 
 
Table A.A.3 presents the Full model specifications from Table 4.3, retaining 
insignificant parameter estimates.  In Maryland the indicator for Family History and 




Table A.A.3: Probit models of the auction participation decision from the Full 
specification of Table 4.3, including insignificant point estimates (standard error) 
 MD  VA   
Constant -1.3244*  0.4113  
 (0.2348)  (0.3644)  
Demographics  
Stopped Crabbing 0.4696*  
 (0.1720)  
Latent 0.8978*  
 (0.1507)  
Probably Crab -0.3616*  -0.3733*  
 (0.1565)  (0.1809)  
Commercial -0.4466*  
 (0.1706)  
Both Rec. and Comm. -0.5060*   
 (0.1451)   
Mult holders at address 0.6373*  
 (0.3496)  
Distance 0.6330*  -1.0967*  
 (0.2898)  (0.4554)  
Within 35 miles   -0.5967*  
    (0.2657)  
Non-crabbing licenses -0.4326*  
 (0.1743)  
Utility indicators 
Bid amount 0.7853*  1.4177*  
 (0.2638)  (0.5996)  
Bequest -2.4237*  
 (1.0264)  
Family History -0.0668  
 (0.0757)  
Profits   -1.3289 
   (0.8334) 
Identity   1.1399*  
   (0.6401)  
Enjoy crabbing  -1.5660*  





Table A.A.3 (continued): Probit models of the auction participation decision 
from the Full specification of Table 4.3, including insignificant point estimates 
(standard error) 
 MD  VA   
Subjective Probability   
Late Reporting -0.9476*  
 (0.2484)  
High Education -0.4143*   
 (0.1962)    
Heard   -0.8224*  
  (0.2896)  
Two pot licenses   1.3997*  
  (0.7079)  
Observations 743  390  
*Significant < 10% level 
 
 
Table A.A.4 presents results of the posted offer participation decision model 
in Maryland.  Models 1 and 2 investigate the decision of whether to accept or reject 
the posted price, with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the individual accepted the 
offer and 0 otherwise.  Models 3 and 4 of Table A.A.4 investigate those seeming 
preference reversals between the auction and posted offer.  The binary dependent 
variable in these two models takes a value of 1 if the individual bid above $2,260 in 
the auction and subsequently accepted the posted price of $2,260, and a value of 0 if 
the individual bid above $2,260 in the auction and rejected the posted price.  The only 






Table A.A.4: Maryland probit models of the posted offer participation 
decision (standard error), including insignificant point estimates. 
WTA measured in $10,000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent variable Accepted Accepted Reversal Reversal 
Constant -0.9178* -1.2004* 0.0171 0.7448 
 (0.3254) (0.3224) (0.6688) (0.8323) 
Stopped Crabbing 0.5404* 0.5658* 0.5819 0.8624 
 (0.2123) (0.2097) (0.4841) (0.6100) 
Latent 0.9474* 1.0310* 0.0123 0.4105 
 (0.1706) (0.1699) (0.3551) (0.4700) 
Probably Crab -0.7970* -0.7187* -0.7984* -0.5355 
 (0.1689) (0.1688) (.3426) (0.4138) 
Commercial -0.6053* -0.6009* -0.4544 -0.1879 
 (0.2132) (0.2109) (0.4059) (0.5169) 
Both Rec. and Comm. -0.4789* -0.4799* -0.5828* -0.7107* 
 (0.1659) (0.1644) (0.3398) (0.4167) 
Age -0.5153* -0.5723* -0.7402* -0.5219 
 (0.1587) (0.1538) (0.3261) (0.3907) 
Mult holders at address -0.2354 -0.1298 0.2281 -0.2406 
 (0.6142) (0.5737) (0.7045) (1.0379) 
Distance 0.1358 0.0455 -0.0923 -0.4811 
 (0.3289) (0.3343) (0.5334) (0.6236) 
WTA -0.2192* 0.8901*  -3.2844* 
 (0.0769) (0.2989)  (1.0887) 
Bequest -0.7046* -0.6918* -0.7633* 0.1611 
 (0.1509) (0.1485) (0.3317) (0.4621) 
Family History -0.0839 -0.1396 0.4805 0.2886 
 (0.1743) (0.1706) (0.3712) (0.4899) 
Identity -0.0167 -0.0101 -0.2009 -0.1387 
 (0.1552) (0.1532) (0.3217) (0.3804) 
Enjoy crabbing -0.1630 -0.2191 0.4126 0.9321* 
 (0.1530) (0.1511) (0.3224) (0.4871) 
Late Reporting 0.9440* 0.9315* 0.6735* 0.9609* 
 (0.2077) (0.2084) (0.4056) (0.4637 
High Education 0.1506 0.1341 -0.1449 0.1927 
 (0.1452) (0.1439) (0.3120) (0.4135) 
Observations 742 742 100 91a 
*Significant < 10% level 
aDrops one individual who provided WTA > $50,000 but accepted 






The Logit regression in Table A.A.5 presents the response models of Table 
4.10, including insignificant point estimates.  Although significant differences appear 
between survey respondents and nonrespondents, these differences are not across all 
variables important in the bidding model.   
 
Table A.A.5: Logit regressions of the response to the mail survey, with 
the dependent variable equaling one if an individual responded to the mail 
survey and zero otherwise, including insignificant point estimates 
(standard error) 
Selection Model Maryland Virginia 
Constant -0.3383 -1.3953* 
 (0.2076) (0.2029) 
Average licenses -0.2782*  
 (0.0730)  
Bid 0.3300* 0.0694 
 (0.1236) (0.1285) 
Personal 0.0030*  
 (0.0014)  
Retail 0.0121*  
 (0.0057)  
Age -0.5023*  
 (0.0731)  
Buyback -0.6424*  
 (0.1206)  
Distance 0.3504* -0.1240 
 (0.1666) (0.2453) 
Within 35 mi  -0.0620 
  (0.1658) 
Number of years fished 0.0230* 0.1008* 
 (0.0110) (0.0173) 
Mult holders at address -0.4876* -0.4937* 
 (0.2043) (0.1688) 
Profits 0.0469 -0.1126* 
 (0.0828) (0.0517) 
Latent -0.1817  





Table A.A.5 (continued): Logit regressions of the response to the mail 
survey, with the dependent variable equaling one if an individual 
responded to the mail survey and zero otherwise, including insignificant 
point estimates (standard error) 
Selection Model Maryland Virginia 
Stopped Crabbing -0.2253*  
 (0.1103)  
Late Reporting -0.0724  
 (0.0877)  
Non-crabbing licenses  0.0574 
  (0.1302) 
Two Pot licenses  -0.0768 
  (0.1237) 
Observations 3588 1767 
Model Likelihood Ratio 0.0000 0.0000 




APPENDIX B: Multiple Imputations with Predicted Means 
Matching (PMM) 
 
MI datasets were created using the MICE package (van Buuren & Groothuis-
Oudshoorn, 2011) in R (R Development Core Team, 2011).  The PMM algorithm was 
first outlined by Rubin (1987), who details the process as follows. 
Assume the need to predict a univariate continuous random variable 
	~	 , , for which some observations are missing.  Define  as the number 
of observed ,  as the number of missing , and q as the number of parameters to 
be estimated.   
 
Define: 
(A.B.1)  ∑ 	∈	 / , 
(A.B.2)  ∑ 	∈	 ∑ 	∈	 . 
 
Predicted means are generated in the following three steps: 
1. Draw a  random variable  and calculate ∗ / . 
2. Draw  independent variates from the standard normal distribution to 
form vector  and calculate ∗ ∗ ∑ 	∈	 , with 
∑ 	∈	  representing a Cholesky factorization. 
3. Independently draw  variates  from the standard normal distribution 





Match the  variables ∗ to the nearest prediction for an observed , and set the 
missing observation equal to the observed value.  Repeat the preceding steps  times 
to create  full datasets.  The analysis of interest, in this case the estimation of 
equation 2.12, is then conducted independently on each of the  datasets.     
The results of the analysis are then combined as specified by Rubin (1987).  
Point estimates for the parameters of interest are simply the average of the point 
estimates derived from each of the  datasets.  For example, the estimated parameter 
on mean historical profits, , is combined such that the final estimate, ̅ , is 
calculated as ̅ 	 ∑ , where  is the point estimate in each complete dataset.  
The combination of results explicitly considers both the within and between dataset 
variation.  The within dataset variation, , is simply the average variance of the  
dataset estimates such that ∑ .  The between dataset variation,  is 
calculated as ∑ ̅ ̅ / 1 , where  now represents 
the vector of parameters estimated from each imputed dataset, and ̅  is a vector of 
parameter means calculated across imputed datasets.   
The within and between variance is then combined to calculate a total 
variance for the analysis, 1 .  Inference is conducted under 
the assumption that / ( ̅ ~ .  The degrees of freedom of the t 
distribution, , is calculated such that  (Barnard & Rubin, 1999).  In 
this formulation 1 1 ,  1




data, and  is the trace operator.  This degrees of freedom calculation directly 
considers the fact that the finite  imputations are used to approximate the 
asymptotically normal distribution of ̅ , as well as the increased uncertainty 
due to non-response, in the calculation of critical values.  
 In this paper I impute WTA values for the 30 percent of survey respondents 
who did not submit them.  Following the literature (Schafer, 1997), I use a shifted-log 
transformation on the WTA values to produce a more normally distributed dependent 
variable for imputation.  The imputed variable is thus ln .  The 
shifter   is used to address skewness in the distribution of the WTA values, and is 
chosen by Maximum Likelihood estimation to produce zero skewness.  The shifter  
is calculated to be 0.0020 and -0.0103 respectively for the Maryland and Virginia.   
The shifted-log of WTA values are modeled as functions of variables which 
theoretically could be important components of WTA.  These variables include all 
those present in the empirical specification of equation 2.12, as prescribed by Rubin 
(1996).  In Maryland these variables were supplemented with the natural log of an 
individual’s average annual historical profits, indicator variables for the importance 
of profits, enjoyment of crabbing, and identity value for the license, the age of the 
license holder, indicator variables for whether the individual has heard of other 
licenses being sold, if the individual thought it was either likely or very likely that the 
crab population would return to higher and more sustainable levels in the next ten 
years, and the mean earnings from the individual’s zip code.  Virginia’s imputation 
model was supplemented by the natural log of an individual’s average annual 




identity, and bequest values of the license, whether an individual was classified as 
wait listed or full time in the auction, whether an individual completed at least some 
college coursework, whether the license holder was over 60 at the time of the 
buyback, whether the individual self classified as recreational or both recreational and 
commercial, whether the individual felt it was very unlikely that the crab population 
would return to higher sustainable levels in the next ten years, and whether the 
individual held a large (  255 pot) license.  WTA values were retransformed after 
imputation. 
 In the investigation of item nonresponse, I imputed 5 different values for each 
missing WTA observation, with 40 MCMC iterations between each draw.  The 40 
iterations provide a burn-in period through which any sensitivity to starting values 
due to autocorrelation of the simulations can be addressed.   
 The benefit of using a PMM algorithm over alternatives is its ability to hold 
imputations within the range of observed outcomes.  This is an important 
characteristic when modeling bids, as imputing a negative value for what should be a 
non-negative bid amount could have adverse consequences for the analysis.  The 
PMM algorithm also allows preservation of nonlinear relationships between 
predictors and dependent variables.  
 The largest drawback with the PMM algorithm is the potential to provide 
insufficient variation in the imputations due to a lack of strong predictors.  Figure 
A.B.1 provides a graph of the distributions of observed and imputed WTA values for 
Virginia.  As can be seen, the PMM algorithm provides for good variation between 




Table 4.5 were compared to imputations generated directly through the third step of 
the PMM algorithm, such that the imputed WTA value ∗ ∗ ∗ , which 
provided very similar results.  
 
 
Figure A.B.1: Distribution of observed and imputed WTA values for Virginia 
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APPENDIX C: Categorical Variable Imputations 
 
In addition to the PMM algorithm implemented for continuous variables, I 
also utilized two algorithms to impute categorical variables for the simulations 
presented in Chapter 5, one for dichotomous variables and one for categorical 
variables for more than two levels. 
Dichotomous variables are imputed as follows: 
Assume  is a dichotomous variable, and that | , 	Λ 1
Λ , and Λ exp / 1 exp .  Some of the observations on  are 
missing, such that  is the number of missing observations and  is the number of 
observed .  Estimate, by maximum likelihood, the log-likelihood 	
∑ 	∈	 ln Λ 1 ln	 1 	Λ  by numerically solving the first 
order conditions ∑ 	∈	 Λ .  The variance is estimated as the 
negative inverse of the hessian matrix ∑ Λ 1	∈	
Λ .   
 
Imputations are drawn following these steps: 
Draw ∗ from , . 
For each missing observation ∈  calculate Λ ∗ . 
Draw  independent uniform (0,1) random numbers,  and if 
Λ ∗ , ∈  impute 0, otherwise impute 1. 








, 	 	 .  Normalizing one of the  vectors to 
zero means that 1 parameter vectors need to be estimated.  The multinomial logit 
log-likelihood is then defined as 	 ∑ ∑ 	 		∈	 ln	 ∑ 	 	
.  The 
first order conditions, ∑ 	∈	 ∑ 	 	
, 	 	 1.  
 
Imputations are drawn following these steps: 




, 	 ∈ . 
3. Draw  uniform (0,1) random numbers, . 
Calculate a vector of cumulative probabilities, 
 ∑ ∗	∈ , … , ∑ ∗	∈ , and impute missing value 
 ∗  as the first category for which the cumulative probability is larger than  
. 
 
In Maryland, the following dichotomous variables used directly in the analysis 
were imputed for individuals who did not respond to the survey: Probably crab, 
Bequest, Identity, and High Education.  The Commercial, Recreational, and Both 
comm. and rec. indicator variables from the analysis were imputed as a three-level 
categorical variable. A very small number of individuals lacked the Distance variable, 
as their address could not be located with GIS software.  This continuous variable is 
imputed using a PMM algorithm.  In addition, I imputed the following auxiliary 
variables used to impute the variables of interest: dichotomous variables indicating 
the importance of the Enjoyment of Crabbing, Family History, and Profits in the 




imputed auxiliary variables used in the imputation process include the average 
percentage of harvest history distributed to retailers, dealers, the public, and for 
personal consumption, the average percentage of trips using crab traps, scrapes, 
trotlines, and small pots as their primary gear, the average number of non-crabbing 
licenses an individual held across their harvest history, whether the individual 
accepted the posted price offer, the number of years an individual was active in the 
data, and the average number of hours and the average total annual days crabbed 
across an individual’s harvest history.   
In Virginia the variables Heard, Enjoy crabbing, Identity value, and Probably 
crab, and the indicator variables Commercial, Recreational, and Both comm. and rec. 
are all imputed for both direct use in the estimations of the paper and for imputing an 
individual’s WTA values.  All of these are dichotomous variables, except the last 
three indicator variables, which are imputed as a three level categorical variable.  As 
in Maryland, a very small number of individuals lacked a distance variable due to 
their address being unidentifiable with GIS software, and this continuous variable was 
imputed using a PMM algorithm.  Auxiliary variables High Education and an 
indicator variable for the importance of profits were imputed as dichotomous 
variables.  The auxiliary variables including the size of the license, the average 
percentage of trips using trotlines, small pots, medium pots and peeler pots as their 
primary gear, the average number of crabbing and non-crabbing licenses an 
individual held across their harvest history, whether the individual accepted the 
posted price offer, the number of years an individual was active in the data, whether 




harvest history, and the average number of trips per year using both hard and peeler 
pots, were all used in the imputation process. 
In Table A.C.1 I investigate the extent to which nonresponse bias effects the 
estimation by comparing the WTA results of Table 4.2 with results of MI datasets, in 
which all missing data is imputed.  One hundred draws were made for each missing 
observation, and the results were combined in the same manner as described in 
Appendix B.  All specifications are semilog, with the natural log of an individual’s 
WTA as the dependent variable.  Point estimates across Maryland’s specifications are 
generally consistent, with the biggest deviation resting with the Profits, and 
Commercial parameters.  Virginia’s parameter estimates diverge to a much greater 






Table A.C.1: Estimation of the WTA function comparing results of Table 4.2 
with MI regression analysis to control for potential unit nonresponse bias 
(standard error) 
Coefficient MD WTA MDMI VA WTA VA MI 
Constant -2.8138* -2.8594* -2.8014* -2.0284* 
(0.1273) (0.1134) (0.2017) (0.1635) 
Profits 0.4513* 0.1781* 0.1658* 0.2202* 
(0.0856) (0.0792) (0.0502) (0.0436) 
Probably crab 0.2836* 0.3196* 0.3940* 0.0636 
(0.1177) (0.0908) (0.1550) (0.0879) 
Age 0.4968* 0.4785* 
(0.0837) (0.0782) 
Bequest 0.2909* 0.2752* 
(0.0863) (0.0775) 
Both rec. and comm. 0.1753* 0.1776* 
(0.0870) (0.0744) 
Latent -0.3098* -0.3230* 
(0.1060) (0.1006) 
Commercial 0.2544* 0.7368* 0.2762* 
(0.1310) (0.1473) (0.0911) 
Enjoy crabbing 0.4394* 0.1028 
(0.1138) (0.0702) 
Large pot license 0.8683* 0.8042* 
(0.1487) (0.1473) 
Wait list -0.3887* -0.8583 
(0.1852) (0.1621) 
Peeler Pot License 0.5898* 0.5381* 
(0.1493) (0.1545) 
Non-crabbing license 0.4185* 0.3705* 
(0.1325) (0.0946) 






APPENDIX D: Inverse Propensity Weighted (IPW) Estimator 
Table A.D.1 presents IPW estimators of the bid function, compared to the 
unweighted OLS, with the natural log of an individual’s WTA as the dependent 
variable for each state.  Maryland and Virginia’s point estimates respectively differ 
by an average of 22 and 18 percent of the unweighted standard error.  The only p-
value which differs greatly across specifications is the parameter associated with the 
Both rec. and comm. indicator, which is not significant at any conventional level for 
Maryland’s IPW specification.  Although a comparison of point estimates suggest 
that the two models are not significantly different, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
suggests that the conditional means are, in fact, drawn from different distributions, 
with a p-value of 0.0000 and an unweighted mean significantly larger that the IPW 
mean for both states, with a positive suggested bias of roughly 2.5-4% in the OLS 






Table A.D.1: Estimation of the WTA function comparing Table 4.2 results with 
an IPW regression to control for potential unit nonresponse bias (standard error) 
Coefficient MD WTA MD IPWa VA WTA VA IPWa 
Constant -2.8138* -2.8300* -2.8014* -2.7898* 
(0.1273) (0.1315) (0.2017) (0.2040) 
Profits 0.4513* 0.4523* 0.1658* 0.1385* 
(0.0856) (0.1350) (0.0502) (0.0382) 
Probably crab 0.2836* 0.2912* 0.3940* 0.4120* 
(0.1177) (0.1332) (0.1550) (0.1872) 
Age 0.4968* 0.4545* 
(0.0837) (0.0997) 
Bequest 0.2909* 0.2966* 
(0.0863) (0.0907) 
Both rec. and comm. 0.1753* 0.1154 
(0.0870) (0.0928) 
Latent -0.3098* -0.3179* 
(0.1060) (0.1106) 
Commercial 0.7368* 0.7371* 
(0.1473) (0.1504) 
Enjoy crabbing 0.4394* 0.3871* 
(0.1138) (0.1198) 
Large pot license 0.8683* 0.8650* 
(0.1487) (0.1483) 
Wait list -0.3887* -0.3634* 
(0.1852) (0.2039) 
Peeler Pot License 0.5898* 0.6018* 
(0.1493) (0.1574) 
Non-crabbing license 0.4185* 0.3959* 
(0.1325) (0.1536) 
Observations 768 766 431 431 
*Significant at < 10% level 





APPENDIX E: Survey of Maryland License Holders  
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